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ABSTRACT
The Untold History of Nevada’s Shield Statute
By
Matthew Ward
Dr. Stephen Bates, Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Journalism and Media Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The history of American journalism is replete with anecdotes about news
reporters enduring jail and other penalties to protect the identities of confidential sources
of information. Since as early as the American Revolution journalists have often found
themselves at odds with established authority. In the political cauldron of the late 1960s
and early 1970s, U.S. government intrusion into the news gathering process was
widespread. The notion the First Amendment protected journalists from revealing
sources was invalidated by the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.
Many states throughout the nation reacted by codifying a reporter’s privilege. Nevada
did so in 1969, protecting members of the working media from having to divulge
confidences to the government. The statute was revised in 1975 to cover former media
members, but the law has remained unchanged since, despite much technological
innovation and economic changes in the media industry. This study tells the untold story
of Nevada’s shield statute, the 1968 news story that sparked the quiet crusade for its
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passage, and the not-so quiet efforts in 1975 to make the already strong protections even
stronger. It details as well a later unsuccessful attempt to modernize the law.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“I want to know who those felons are” (W. Lerude, personal communication,
September 20, 2014).
It is to these eight words, spoken in 1968 in a not-so-unthreatening manner to
Warren Lerude, then editor of the Reno Evening Gazette, to which one can trace the
lineage of Nevada’s Revised Statute 49.275. This is the state’s shield law, Nevada's
statutory embrace of a testimonial privilege reserved for journalists. The privilege itself
is a social and political construct that has its roots in pre-colonial American history. In its
modern incarnation, though, this construct reflects a set of sometimes contradictory ideals
uniquely representative of the American constitutional experience, with its competing
values involving free expression and the right to publish versus the rule of law and equal
protection. Lerude was on the side of free expression and protecting his First
Amendment right to gather and disseminate news in 1968. William Raggio, the man who
asked for the identities of “those felons,” was on the other side. He was the law (W.
Lerude, personal communication, September 20, 2014).
Raggio was then serving as the elected district attorney for Washoe County, where
“the Biggest Little City in the World” is located. Raggio would earn the distinction of
being the longest serving state senator in Nevada history before he died in 2012. In 1968,
Raggio had been Washoe County’s top law enforcer for a decade already. He even ran
for the Republican nomination for U.S. senator in 1968, losing in the GOP primary
election (Reno Evening Gazette, April 26, 1968, A1). Raggio was in a unique position to
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witness firsthand how the political and social fabric of both the nation and his own
community had so drastically changed in the decade leading up to 1968.
The assassination of a U.S. president in broad daylight, the eruption of full-scale
combat in Southeast Asia, bloody divisions over civil rights, the rise of anti-war and
hippie movements and the attendant emergence of a drug culture along with them: All
tentacles of momentous shifts in American life that impacted Reno, Nevada just as they
did communities across the nation. The front pages of the Reno Evening Gazette
throughout 1968 served helpings of everything momentous—fighting the “Reds” in
Vietnam, astronauts traveling to the moon, Bobby Kennedy’s and Martin Luther King
Jr.’s cold-blooded slayings, the Nevada National Guard called to Korea in the wake of the
U.S.S. Pueblo incident, and this new national scourge, drugs. It was this last subject—
specifically marijuana use—that spurred Raggio’s demand for names from the editor of
the local daily newspaper that year.
The Reno Evening Gazette had just published a story about University of Nevada
students smoking marijuana on campus. A photograph accompanying the story slyly
silhouetted a group of students partaking in cannabis, hiding their identities. As Lerude
would later explain in a letter provided as part of testimony to the Nevada Assembly
Judiciary Committee on March 27, 1975—and again 39 years later during an interview
with the author—he and his newspaper were concerned with the burgeoning drug culture
and its effects on Reno’s young people. “We knew if the story were to truthfully inform
the public of this problem, we would have to go to the offenders and get their views,”
Lerude wrote to state legislators. He continued by describing that conversation with
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Raggio, without identifying the, by then, former district attorney. “The district attorney
at that time quickly reminded me that the marijuana smoking sources of ours were
criminals, felons.” Indeed, in 1968, possession of any amount of marijuana was
sufficient to earn one a felony criminal charge in Nevada. “And the district attorney told
me he could seek out the names of those criminal/sources of ours. And should we, as
newspapermen, refuse to reveal our sources, we could end up in jail.
“The reason: Nevada had no shield law,” he wrote (Lerude, 1975).
The 1975 letter is only a snippet of a larger history. Lerude’s letter does not hint
at how he was able to get a shield law passed in the first place. It does not reveal that
before 1968 he was opposed to enacting a shield law in Nevada altogether. He did not
reveal in 1975 what he and others modeled Nevada’s statute upon or why they chose in
1968 to keep the new shield law virtually hidden from public view by not even reporting
its passage in their own newspapers. The purpose of this thesis is to uncover this history
and with it to contribute to a wider understanding of the current state of the reporter’s
privilege, both in Nevada and throughout the nation. Shield laws and efforts to enact
similar legislation in Congress have been fodder for a much broader debate on First
Amendment principles and the tension between press freedoms and the government’s
right to collect evidence and seek justice for more than 100 years (Smith, 2013, Martin &
Fargo, 2013, Docter, 2010, Bates, 2010, Easton, 2009, Abramowicz, 2008, Pieroni, 2008,
Siegel, 2006, Durity, 2006, Lee, 2006, Van Gerpen, 1979, Semeta, 1960, Beatman, 1959).
To better establish the context in which Nevada legislators agreed to consider a
shield law and then revise it just six years later, the following pages will highlight first
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the long and, some would argue, sketchy history of the reporter’s privilege in America in
general. The following chapter will examine the attempts at various federal legislative
efforts to protect reporters. This thesis will examine the differences between an absolute
versus qualified reporter’s privilege. Also, an explication of federal and state court
decisions regarding the privilege and state shield laws is in order, particularly since one
of the reasons cited by advocates urging legislators to revise Nevada’s law in 1975 was
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes (1972). That 1972 decision was
a seminal moment in the history of the reporter’s privilege, because in a still controversial
and widely debated 5-4 decision the court found that the First Amendment’s press clause
contains no special protections for journalists that are not also in place for the average
citizen (Branzburg v. Hayes, 1972). In addition, one leg of the Branzburg case, its
namesake in fact, involves a Kentucky reporter refusing to divulge the identities of drugusing sources in news stories he produced when asked to do so by law enforcement
authorities.
No examination of the literature surrounding the reporter’s privilege is complete
without also describing the subject’s central conundrum. Much scholarship has been
dedicated to debating how state and federal reporter’s privileges, whether codified by
statute or qualified by court precedent, define the term “reporter” or “journalist.” The
various conflicts that have arisen as a result of legislators attempting to define these terms
in crafting shield protections has led to much debate. Even as Nevada crafted its own
shield statute in 1969 this question was raised. Defining the term “journalist” is still
pertinent to Silver State media professionals today because Nevada’s shield statute does
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not offer protections to digital or non-traditional journalists. A review of the current state
of journalism in Nevada and across the United States has shown a quick evolution toward
digital media formats as traditional media forms diminish more and more each year
(Mitchell, 2014, Moody’s Investor Service, 2014). Shield laws in Nevada and many
other states simply have not kept pace with this media evolution (Martin & Fargo, 2013,
Robben, 2012, Durity, 2006). In fact, the patchwork of qualified and absolute protections
across the country is generally the reason given for urging Congress to pass a model
federal shield. The literature shows, however, that the 80-year-old effort to do that has in
fact been most bedeviled by this one facet of the subject: How does one define the term
journalist?
After an examination of the literature and this central issue at the privilege’s heart,
this thesis will tell the history of the Nevada shield law, from Raggio’s demand for the
names of “those felons” to efforts undertaken during the summer of 2014 when a
committee created by the Nevada Attorney General’s Office examined whether the state
should attempt to modernize the shield statute to make it more inclusive in the face of so
much change in the media landscape since 1975. This section will include details that
even Lerude admits—today the 77-year-old is professor emeritus at the University of
Nevada, Reno, where he taught media law for three decades—were never made public.
Voices from the past will be heard again, including from Bill Farr, who served 46 days in
jail in 1972 for declining to reveal his sources to a superior court judge. This was the
most lengthy recorded jail term served by a U.S. journalist for not revealing a source to
government authorities until 2001, when a novice author served 168 days in jail for not
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handing over her source material to federal authorities in Texas (Garcia, 2002). Pulitzer
Prize winning journalist Ron Einstoss, a 1955 University of Nevada graduate, testified on
behalf of Nevada’s shield protections in 1975. Joining him was also Reno Evening
Gazette reporter Mark Oliva and Tad Dunbar of KOLO-TV in Reno. Their arguments
echoed sentiments raised during the Supreme Court’s Branzburg case, raising important
issues about the freedom of the press, its function as a check on government authority, the
practice of keeping confidences in order to gain the trust of important sources, all equally
important efforts to keep the “free flow of information” unobstructed (See appendices G,
K, and L). It is argued that all of this is necessary to protect the public’s right to know. A
better informed public ideally leads to better self-governance. Advocates for a strong
reporter’s privilege have long argued that this is precisely the purpose of pursuing and
protecting these lofty goals (Pracene, 2005, Van Gerpen, 1979, Whalen, 1973).
Finally, this thesis will address recent efforts to overhaul the Nevada shield
statute. The underlying philosophical arguments for modernizing the law will be
addressed. The pros and cons of doing such will be set out. The finer points of whether
the law should be made more inclusive by embracing an emerging method of thinking
about protections for journalism over journalists will be expounded upon as well. In the
conclusion, this thesis will compare and contrast the three defining eras of the statute’s
existence—passage, revision and attempted modernization—to place Nevada’s shield law
and its history in context with radical changes to the state’s—and the nation’s—media
landscape.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Origins of a Testimonial Privilege
A court’s ability to obtain “every man’s evidence” is a doctrinal centerpiece of
western jurisprudence. The guarantee of a fair trial rests on the ability of jurists to collect
and weigh evidence, including testimony from citizens with knowledge deemed
important to a criminal or civil inquiry (Blackmer v. United States, 1932; Blair v. United
States, 1919). Often this is done through a legal instrument called a subpoena, which can
be served on any person by legal authorities. Subpoenas are most often served on
witnesses called to testify before grand juries, or in civil and criminal court trials.
Ignoring a subpoena is often punishable by a contempt of court citation, which can spell
jail time, heavy fines, or both.
Exceptions to this practice of compelling and collecting witness testimony are
few. Common law in the U.S. originated with states adopting English rules and court
precedents at the birth of the nation with slight modification over time (Wigmore, 1961).
This body of law recognizes several types of privileged communications—attorneyclient, spousal, and priest-parishioner privileges to name a few. This means an attorney
can not be called to testify against a client, a wife against a husband and vice versa, or a
pastor against a member of his flock. Privileges in the common law have been extended
before, to doctors and their patients for example, through judicial rulings or via statute,
codified by state legislatures or in Congress. Journalists in America have attempted since
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pre-colonial days to persuade authorities to recognize a similar such testimonial privilege
for their work with little success.
John Peter Zenger’s name is frequently invoked when discussion and debate erupt
over the reporter’s privilege and its historical origins. His name is listed first in a 2010
First Amendment Center historical timeline of journalists jailed in America for refusing to
reveal the identities of confidential sources and other information. “John Peter Zenger,
the German-born immigrant publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, was acquitted of
seditious libel for his newspaper’s anonymous criticisms of New York’s Colonial Gov.
William Cosby. Some scholars say this trial was the first documented case in American
history of a journalist’s defiance of a government order to reveal sources” (Belt, 2010).
Van Gerpen (1979) similarly refers to Zenger’s 1735 arrest and trial as among the first
instances of an American journalist being jailed for not cooperating with authorities (5).
In his book Privileged Communication and the Press: The citizen’s right to know versus
the law’s right to confidential news source evidence, Van Gerpen points out that most
accounts of this historic event center around lawyer Andrew Hamilton’s masterful
defense of Zenger, who was facing seditious libel charges and sat in jail for nine months
awaiting trial. It was during this jail term that Zenger was steadfast in his refusal to name
the author of his newspaper’s critical commentary.
Van Gerpen cites Zenger’s case and Benjamin Franklin’s autobiography to
illustrate an early adherence to a professional code of ethics when it came to keeping
confidential sources critical of government (5-6). Franklin described his own early
confrontation with authorities: “One of the Pieces in our News-Paper, on some political
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Point which I have now forgotten, gave Offense to the Assembly. He (Franklin’s
employer, a printer) was taken up, censur’d and imprison’d for a month by the Speaker’s
Warrant, I suppose because he would not discover his Author. I too was taken up and
examin’d before the Council; but tho’ I did not give them any Satisfaction, they contented
themselves with admonishing me, and dismiss’s me; considering me perhaps as an
Apprentice who was bound to keep his Master’s Secrets” (cited in Van Gerpen, p. 6). It
is out of such confrontations with authorities in colonial America that an emphasis on
freedom of the press emerged in the codified language of America’s Bill of Rights.
Van Gerpen illustrates various clashes between the press and government
authorities throughout his tome, providing rich anecdotal information about how
journalists sometimes fell afoul of officialdom. There was Simonton of the New York
Times in 1857, jailed by the House of Representatives for an editorial criticizing lobbying
practices in Congress (7). In 1870, Scott Smith of the New York Evening Post wrote an
article exposing payments to several congressmen from a faction of Cubans seeking to
influence the vote to recognize the island republic. Smith based his story on information
from a confidential source. He refused to identify his source when asked to testify and
was threatened with losing his seat in the House press gallery (7). In 1871, two New York
Tribune reporters acquired a copy of the Treaty of Washington, then before the Senate for
ratification. The Senate wished to keep the treaty’s contents a secret. When the reporters
were subpoenaed to appear before a committee and name their source, they refused.
“They rested refusal on the grounds of professional honor” (7). In 1897, a man who told
a reporter he witnessed a murder tried in court to claim that what he said was confidential
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because he was talking to a reporter. In 1911, a Georgia reporter was fined $50 for
refusing to name a police officer who had given him information about a crime (14). In
1913, New York Tribune city editor George Burdick, author of a series of stories on
customs fraud, invoked the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protections to keep from
being compelled to name his sources.
Burdick v. United States (1915) was the first federal case to go to court involving
the reporter’s privilege, though Burdick utilized Fifth Amendment arguments rather than
a First Amendment one (Smith, pp. 16-17). When Burdick was pardoned by President
Woodrow Wilson, he rejected the presidential pardon and continued to maintain his Fifth
Amendment right not to incriminate himself (Van Gerpen, 14). In 1929, three reporters
for the Washington Times were jailed after refusing a grand jury’s demand for the names
of speakeasy operators who sold the newsmen liquor as part of a story they wrote. The
trio was sentenced to 45 days in jail for refusing to testify. Their incarceration likely
helped spur the first legislation introduced in Congress that same year to protect reporters
from forced disclosure (14-15). Only one case, from 1914, is cited whereby a reporter
actually acquiesced to a demand to reveal his source (In re Wayne, 1914, cited by Van
Gerpen, 1979, Sherwood, 1970). Dozens more journalists would continue to go to jail in
defiance of legal authorities throughout the 1900s and into the 2000s.
High-profile prosecutions of journalists undoubtedly led to judicial and legislative
action, some in favor of the press, some not, often followed closely by academic
scholarship on the subject. The literature can be divided into three distinct periods—
pre-1970s, 1970s and post-1970s. The 1970s were both a turning point and a mid-point
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because a new wave of political and social upheaval brought about some of the biggest
clashes between press and government leading to calls for more state shield laws. Before
then scholarship regarding the reporter’s privilege was noticeably antagonistic toward the
professional media’s attempt to invoke any sort of testimonial privilege. In 1959, for
example, a privilege symposium was hosted by the Connecticut Law Review. Student
authors researched and wrote about court-recognized testimonial privileges, including the
attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the priest-parishioner privilege,
the spousal privilege and, finally, the “newsman’s” privilege (Beatman, Baum & Greene,
1959). The authors noted that some privileges were enshrined in state statute and others
grounded in common law or court precedent. One student writer cited research that
suggested the attorney-client privilege first originated in London in 1280 (Baum, 170).
The case of the journalist’s privilege, however, was less settled. After all, “Dean
Wigmore has declared that a testimonial privilege for journalists is not justifiable, and the
American Bar Association has recommended that legislatures not enact such a
privilege” (Beatman, 223). The year 1959 also happened to be the year that a federal
court first considered a case involving the privilege where the defendant attempted to use
a First Amendment argument to withhold the identity of a source (Garland v. Torre,
1959). Before then, journalists had simply invoked their professional credo of
maintaining confidences, an English tradition that harkened back to a much earlier time.
Beatman was aware that by 1959 12 states had already conferred “an absolute, or
‘blanket,’ privilege of non-disclosure of the source upon the journalist” (221). She
recorded her concern that these state shield laws were “excessive in scope and as
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hampering investigation and legal proceedings” (222). Similar musings were set forth in
Semeta (1960). Citing a 1930 meeting of the New York Bar Association Committee on
State Legislation, Semeta reported how lawyers were then viewing the spate of state
shield laws growing organically out of free press concerns in various states; nearby New
Jersey would adopt one in 1933. “They open the way to reckless publication and abuse,
and while on their face they seem to protect the editor and reporter, in reality they protect
the informant. It seems to us that the informant, who furnishes information to a reporter
for the express purpose of having it published, should have no such immunity as these
bills propose” (315). In 1959, a 15-month study of the reporter’s privilege issue was
concluded by the American Civil Liberties Union. A March 18, 1959 New York Times
article announced the group’s finding that “the legislative approach in this field is neither
necessary nor at the present time desirable,” which reflected widespread agreement
among many in the legal profession and in academia prior to the social upheaval of the
1960s and 1970s (317). The 1959 ACLU report continued that “Most of the proposed or
enacted (state shield) statutes seem dangerously loose (in their definition); none of the
statutes has yet been tested for constitutionality, and their survival of such a test may be
doubtful.”
It is no surprise that legal scholars before 1970 considered traditional media’s
claims to a reporter’s privilege spurious at best. The early literature is filled with
references to John Henry Wigmore’s Treatise on Evidence, “probably the most useful and
heavily cited law text of its day” (Northwestern University Archives online). It is as
ubiquitously cited as the Branzburg Supreme Court decision would be in legal
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scholarship post 1972 regarding the reporter’s privilege. Wigmore was a prolific scholar.
He was dean of Northwestern University’s law school from 1901 to 1929. During his
tenure and after, he made several major contributions to American legal studies, including
an oft-cited treatise on evidence that included a dissection of privileges—he did not
support a privilege for reporters (Wigmore, 1961).
Wigmore’s disdain for recognizing a reporter’s privilege is well known and was
echoed by many scholars of his time. Sherwood (1970) cites Wigmore’s response to a
1938 report by the American Bar Association. “Of recent years, there have appeared on
the statute books of several legislatures certain novel privileges . . . [T]hey bear the
marks of having been enacted at the instance of certain occupational organizations . . .
The demand for these privileges seems to have been due, in part to a pride in their
organization and a desire to give it some mark of professional status, and in part to the
invocation of a false analogy to the long-established privileges for certain professional
communications. The analogies are not convincing . . . [W]e recommend against any
further recognition of . . . privilege for information obtained by journalists” (Quoted by
Sherwood, 1214). Numerous judges over many years cited Wigmore in their decisions
denying a reporter’s privilege. Legal scholars before 1970 took note of these decisions.
Beatman cited six early state court cases: Clein v. State (1951), a Florida case involving
gambling and bribery; People ex. rel. Mooney v. Sheriff (1936), a New York gambling
case; In re Grunow (1913), a New Jersey case involving graft by public officials; Plunkett
v. Hamilton (1911), a Georgia case examined below; Ex parte Lawrence (1897), a
California case about state senators taking bribes; and Ex parte Sparrow (1953), a North
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Dakota case involving state prison conditions. The reporter’s privilege was cited but
failed to sway the judge in all of these cases. The courts repeatedly invoked Wigmore’s
treatise on evidence in deciding them as well.
One of the earliest and most cited state reporter’s privilege cases in the early
academic scholarship on the subject is Plunkett v. Hamilton (1911). The case originated
in 1910 when a police source tipped off Augusta Herald reporter T. J. Hamilton about a
murder. The First Amendment Center’s historical timeline of jailed journalists notes:
“Hamilton served five days in jail and was fined $50 for refusing to disclose to a police
review board the name of an officer who had leaked information about a murder” (First
Amendment Center online). Georgia Superior Court Judge J. Lumpkin wrote in his
opinion that Wigmore had laid out clear and convincing arguments for denying a
reporter’s right to refuse to testify. “The real point which the applicant apparently seeks
to make is, that, by promising to keep the name of his informant a secret, he can free
himself from the duty of testifying in a court, when called on so to do, and that
employees can claim an exemption from testifying, because they apprehend that they will
be discharged if they do so. Neither one of these positions is tenable. In 4 Wigmore on
Evidence, § 2192, it is said: ‘For three hundred years it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a
right to every man's evidence’” (Plunkett).
Judge Lumpkin continued in his 1911 opinion to sketch a brief history of the
reporter’s privilege that is valuable here. The judge wrote that journalists and others who
refused to identify sources to authority figures in England did so out of a sense of
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integrity; it was a “point of honor” and it was utilized by colonists in America as well.
“This claim of exemption from testifying . . . was considered and overruled in 1776 in
the Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586, and again in 1777 in Hill's trial, 20
How. St. Tr. 1362. Professor Wigmore states that ‘The ‘point of honor’ thus
disappeared forever as a motive for recognizing a privilege’” (Plunkett). Van Gerpen
wrote that as early as 1562, English judges made no exceptions on the obligation to
testify. He wrote that eventually two exceptions developed, one a short-lived “point of
honor” construct, which was invoked to protect communications between two
“gentlemen” (63). Lumpkin returned to Wigmore multiple times in his decision in
Plunkett. He quoted the much-respected professor over and over. “In general, then, the
mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence, or in the implied
confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege. This rule is not
questioned today. No pledge of privacy, nor oath of secrecy, can avail against demand for
the truth in a court of justice. . . Accordingly, a confidential communication to a clerk,
to a trustee, to a commercial agency, to a banker, to a journalist, or to any other person
not holding one of the specific relations hereafter considered, is not privileged from
disclosure” (Plunkett).
Smith (2013) referred to this consistent reliance on Wigmore’s influential treatise
by the courts when he wrote that early legal writing regarding the reporter’s privilege was
shaped by “parochial” concerns of law school professors and legal practitioners. “Their
single lens for viewing the issue was the common law as they understood it: A testimonial
privilege did not exist.” It was not until the subject moved into the constitutional realm,
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particularly after Garland v. Torre, that “scholars began to theorize rationales based on,
among other theories, the role of the press in a democratic society, the press as a check on
government power, and the press as conduit for the free flow of information to the
public.” Smith (2013), which represents perhaps the latest in-depth scholarship about the
reporter’s privilege, argues that the weight of these contributions combined helped shape
the “noticeable” consensus among scholars since Branzburg in favor of a privilege
despite continued judicial divisions on the subject (43). In other words, the 1960s and
1970s clashes between press and authority were seismic enough to force many legal
scholars to embrace the idea of a testimonial privilege for journalists when very few had
ever done so previously.
In summary regarding the origins of the reporter’s privilege as well as the nature
of early scholarly efforts, two trends are clear: First, many, many journalists went to jail
rather than reveal confidential sources of information going back to pre-colonial days;
second, before the 1970s, legal scholars almost universally disavowed any notion of a
reporter’s privilege and even expressed concerns when state legislatures (no doubt mostly
as reactions to journalists in their state protesting government interference for jailing
them) dared circumvent the courts and common law by enshrining a privilege for
journalists in statute. Starting in 1896 with Maryland, a dozen states had statutory shield
laws in place by 1949 (Semeta, 313). Many members of the press endured jail and other
government sanctions long before then, based on their professional credo and its
inextricable links to the eighteenth century’s “point of honor” construct. In 1934, the
American Newspaper Guild, for example, adopted a code of ethics. It stated in part:
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“Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential
information in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies . . .” (Sherwood,
1203). Today, the Society of Professional Journalists treats the subject somewhat more
softly. Its Code of Ethics urges caution when making promises, “but keep the promises”
you make. It urges journalists to identify sources in an effort to provide the public “as
much information as possible to judge the reliability and motivations of sources.” But the
modern code of ethics also urges reporters to “reserve anonymity for sources who may
face danger, retribution or other harm” (Society of Professional Journalists online).
Nowhere, however, does it urge journalists to refuse to testify in court or answer
subpoenas from government authorities.

Early State Shield Laws

The first time a state legislature enshrined a testimonial privilege for
journalists—they were called “confidence laws” at the time—was in 1896 in Maryland.
Eleven more legislatures passed similar laws shielding journalists over the next 50 years
—New Jersey in 1933, Alabama 1935, California 1935, Arkansas 1936, Kentucky 1936,
Arizona 1937, Pennsylvania 1937, Indiana 1941, Ohio 1941, Montana 1943, and
Michigan 1949. By 1959, Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana,
and Ohio extended their protections to include radio. Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Montana, and Ohio extended theirs to include television by then as well.
Indiana, Montana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania also extended theirs to include protections for
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members of press associations, a trend adopted later by Nevada (Beatman, 220, Semeta,
313).
No one disputes that many of these states adopted shield laws in response to
localized confrontations between press and government authorities. However, the
historical record is incomplete and many times also inaccurate. “One problem with the
lack of ongoing historical research is the perpetuation of small mistakes in the narrative,
such as wrongly attributing Maryland’s 1896 shield law to the jailing of Baltimore Sun
reporter John T. Morris in 1886” (Smith, 32). Smith (2013) showed that Maryland’s
statute was likely the result of an unfolding national scandal in nearby Washington, D.C.,
not over the oft-repeated tale of Morris’ jailing. The same can be said of the literature’s
treatment of the first effort in Congress in 1929 to pass a federal shield. “One would
think that with Congress debating a federal shield law off and on for the last 80 years,
there would be a well-developed record of the first attempt to pass such a law, in 1929.
Yet that important event has been a footnote in the literature, and often an incorrect
footnote at that” (Smith, 33). Smith argued that much less attention has been paid to the
statutory realm compared to the constitutional, which did not even begin to draw scrutiny
until Garland v. Torre in 1959. A body of statutory laws now exists in states across the
country, origins of which trace back 113 years. Historical research that might add
valuable context to current debates remains spotty at best. “Most noticeably absent from
the literature is material that would shed light on the development of shield laws at the
state level. The little scholarship there is hints at the role that journalists, press advocates
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and the public have played in helping to shape the direction of the law” (43). This last
statement could certainly apply to the story of Nevada’s shield law.
Nevada’s original 1969 shield law stated that “No reporter or editorial employee
of any newspaper, periodical, press association or radio or television station may be
required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person,
in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation” (See Appendix A). The law’s authors
deemed it necessary to recount all the authoritative bodies that could not call on a
reporter to testify: state courts, a grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury or jury officer, the
legislature, or any legislative committee, any government department, agency or
commission, or by any local governing body, local committee or officer thereof. The
shield law was amended in 1975 to include the words “or former” with regard to the
types of journalists protected, thereby preventing authorities from waiting until a reporter
left his or her employer before attempting to subpoena them. The 1975 amended law also
added the words “any note, photograph, film, tape recording or other document acquired
or prepared by him in his professional capacity” to the shield law, while keeping the
remainder of the original language (See Appendix F). The shield law is broad in its
protections by any measure. Traditional journalists simply have blanket protection to
shield their sources and their work product from any type of government intrusion.
The academic literature regarding Nevada’s shield law, however, is scant. Like
many of the early states that adopted such laws in the first part of the twentieth century,
Nevada decided to enact an absolute shield privilege. Most states today have only
qualified statutory and court-precedent-styled protections, so any reference to Nevada is
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usually because it is among the minority of states that offer an absolute protection. Van
Gerpen wrote in his 1979 book that “A reporter for the Las Vegas Sun noted that there
was only one incident in which the court was asking for a disclosure of confidences, and
the Nevada shield law protected those involved” (136-137). Martin & Fargo (2013)
mention Nevada only once, concluding that its statute is among five that “stand out for
the brevity of their definitions of both function and format in regard to covered persons
and organizations” (62). Siegel (2006) called Nevada and Montana both models for
strong, absolute reporter protections. The research noted that “Nevada's statute protects
journalists from having to reveal their sources, as well as published and unpublished
information” (503). At various times in the literature, however, Nevada is not even
considered. Pieroni (2008) took a detour to explain the vast differences among states
even when their laws offered similar protections, and in a list of states having absolute
privileges, Nevada was accidentally omitted (814).
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press—founded in 1970 by among
others Earl Caldwell, one of the three reporters who made up the soon-to-be addressed
Branzburg Supreme Court case—features only a few pithy lines about the history and
protections of the Nevada statute: “Nevada is often recognized as having the strongest
shield law in the country. The law protects unpublished and published materials and
protects the confidential sources of libel defendants” (Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press online). There is little case law interpreting the shield law, unlike in many
other states. Among the few times the state’s Supreme Court has addressed the issue, the
shield statute has maintained its integrity and served its purpose. Most recently, in Aspen
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v. Gentry (2013), Nevada’s Supreme Court said the statute serves to “enhance the news
gathering process and to foster the free flow of information.”

Absolute Versus Qualified Privilege

Before addressing the constitutional scholarship that arose out of federal case law
starting in 1959, a brief discussion on the vagaries of absolute versus qualified privilege
is in order. Van Gerpen laid out nine questions to be considered when drafting a shield
statute. Among these are: “Who does the privilege protect? Where may the privilege be
asserted? Absolute versus a qualified shield?” (10). Van Gerpen admitted, however, that
what is absolute in one place, may simply not be the case in another, though both make
the same claims. In 1979, it was “somewhat hazardous to attempt to classify state
privilege statutes as conferring an absolute or qualified privilege; in several instances
where it was assumed that the statute conferred an absolute privilege courts have held
otherwise” (18). Simply put, an absolute privilege is designed to protect the journalist
“absolutely” from almost any type of interference from government authorities who seek
to identify confidential sources of information.
Qualified privileges generally are the result of two situations: a state statute
clearly spells out exceptions to the protections—for example, if the reporter should
witness a criminal act firsthand—or the law outlines a balancing test for courts to apply.
These balancing tests can further differentiate types of qualified privileges by allowing
more or less protection depending upon whether information is being sought from a
journalist in a civil versus criminal proceeding. Whatever shield protection a state statute
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offers, it only protects the journalist in “qualified” circumstances. Most state statutes
today are qualified. In federal circuits where a privilege is recognized, they are always
qualified. Examples of states with qualified statutes are California, Colorado and
Delaware. In California the “reporter's privilege only prevents a finding of contempt for
refusal to comply with a subpoena; consequently, it provides virtually no protection to
reporters who are parties to the litigation . . . In addition, the California Supreme Court
has held that the privilege must be balanced against the criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial” (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press). In Colorado, “the law states that
‘no newsperson shall, without such newsperson's express consent, be compelled to
disclose, be examined concerning refusal to disclose, be subject to any legal presumption
of any kind, or be cited, held in contempt, punished, or subjected to any sanction for
refusing to disclose information obtained while ‘acting in the capacity of a newsperson.’ .
. . The Shield Law does not apply where the news information: a) was received at a
press conference; (b) has actually been published or broadcast through a medium of mass
communication; (c) was based on a news person's personal observation of the
commission of a crime if substantially similar news information cannot reasonably be
obtained by any other means; and (d) was based on a news person's personal observation
of the commission of a class 1, 2, or 3 felony” (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press). In Delaware, the “statutory privilege is limited to information obtained within the
scope of the reporter's professional activities. ‘Professional activities’ may include social
gatherings, but do not include instances of intentional concealment of the reporter's
identity as a reporter, or instances wherein the reporter personally witnesses or
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participates in acts of physical violence or property damage” (Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press).
Pieroni (2008) and Siegel (2006) both advocated for a federal shield law that
offers absolute protections and shields journalists in states where similar statutes either
don’t exist, are weak or simply outdated. Both point out that a model federal shield law
offers a solution to the patchwork of qualified and absolute state privilege laws offering
varying degrees of protection across the country. States could, of course, expand the
protections on their own, but at least journalists could count on the consistency offered by
a new federal shield. Siegel used an analogy to explain the problem with many state
shield laws and their statuses: “The inevitable disparity in treatment from case to case is
further exacerbated by the current hodgepodge of state shield law protection. For
example, imagine three reporters, one of each living in the neighboring states of Georgia,
Alabama, and Mississippi. The Alabama reporter would enjoy absolute protection
against compelled disclosure, the Georgia journalist would be covered by a qualified
privilege, and the Mississippi reporter would receive no protection at all” (520). Peironi
argued that the states with judicially-conferred privileges presented similar problems. For
example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota acknowledged a qualified privilege for
confidential information in a civil case, but also recognized that “the interest of the public
in law enforcement and the defendant in discovering exculpatory evidence” may
outweigh the privilege in criminal cases. The Supreme Court of Vermont, conversely,
recognized a qualified privilege in a criminal case, but it has not decided whether the
privilege exists in civil cases (815).
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Peironi (2008) noted that numerous lawsuits naming journalists as well as efforts
in Congress to enact a federal shield have continued to highlight the lack of uniformity
across the nation. An October 2007 report prepared by the House Committee on the
Judiciary concurred. It stated: “A Federal shield law is also needed because of the lack of
uniform standards—at both the Federal level and State level—to govern when testimony
can be sought from reporters” (815). Peironi acknowledged also that the fast-paced
change in the media landscape, the move from traditional news sources to digital and
social media outlets has served to “exacerbate” the problem of inconsistent approaches all
the more. “The days of a reader picking up a newspaper from the front porch and reading
a daily digest of news collected by local reporters from local sources is rapidly coming to
an end. When it does, applying the distinctly local law of a reader's jurisdiction to a
reporter's work in another state, collected from sources in a third state, will cease to make
much sense.” (816)
While the media landscape changes rapidly, including in Nevada, legal
protections for journalists clearly remain problematic in some jurisdictions. Up until now
this review of literature has examined the origins of a testimonial privilege, the early
adherence by some states to create their own statutory privileges outside of the judicial
setting, and the difference between qualified and absolute protections. Now let us shift to
the constitutional debate and the hefty scholarship defining that topic. This piece of the
privilege puzzle concerns scholars the most because a clear answer on whether the First
Amendment provides shield protection remains elusive even 42 years after Branzburg.
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A Constitutional Question: Pre-Branzburg

In the annals of reporter’s privilege literature, scholars agree a turning point of
sorts occurred in 1958, setting the stage for later constitutional squabbles in federal courts
over whether the First Amendment’s press clause provides for a right to gather news, and
thus a right to protect confidential sources from disclosure. What had long been a
common law dispute was about to turn into a First Amendment crusade. The case was
Garland v. Torre (Smith, 2013, Bates, 2010, Fargo, 2003, Van Gerpen, 1979). Marie
Torre was a New York Herald Tribune gossip columnist. She reported a confidential
source telling her that famed actress Judy Garland thought herself “terribly fat,” and
refused to continue a project with CBS. Garland filed a lawsuit against CBS for
$1,393,000 for defamation and breach of contract. But Garland’s attorneys needed
Torre’s source in order to make their case. Torre said at the time she believed “no judge
in the land would ask a reporter to name a news source” (quoted in Bates, 97).
Torre’s attorneys argued that the First Amendment as well as common law
allowed the columnist to keep her confidences protected. The judge in Torre’s case,
Potter Stewart, however, ruled she could not claim a testimonial privilege. “He accepted
the hypothesis that forced disclosure might entail an encroachment on press freedom, but
reasoned that since freedom of the press is not absolute, the question to be determined
was ‘whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the
present case justifies some impairment of the First Amendment freedom’” (Van Gerpen,
88). Torre was eventually found guilty of contempt for refusing to name the source and
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she was sentenced to 10 days in jail, suspended pending appeal (Bates, 105-106). Torre’s
refusal to identify her source, Stewart found, harmed Garland’s ability to make her claim
(Garland v. Torre).
Bates argued that the court introduced a sort of First Amendment balancing test
that would be invoked by federal courts in future cases. It also seemed it was easier for
the appellate court, particularly since Torre was regarded as a mere gossip columnist—
she received little support from newspaper colleagues—to rule she had no constitutional
privilege to withhold the name of her source, especially since the information she
withheld was both material and relevant to Garland’s defamation claim. But, Judge
Stewart did allude to a potential situation where limits to a reporter’s obligation to testify
could be reached, especially in situations where prior restraint to publication or some
wholesale compulsory forced disclosure foisted upon journalists became an issue (Bates,
109). The Supreme Court refused to hear Torre’s appeal and New York’s legislature as a
result sought passage of a shield law for reporters afterward. Congress also saw bills
introduced based on the outcome of Garland v. Torre, particularly since Torre’s jail term
incensed many of her fans (Bates, 112-113).
Scholars agree Garland was a turning point. But another case, this one a state
court decision, may have sparked a much wider legal debate, even, according to Smith,
leading to the creation of several state shield laws. This case was State v. Buchanan
(1966), an Oregon case featuring a fight between press and government authority that,
like Paul Branzburg’s ordeal a few year later, involved reporting on drug abuse from the
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perspective of unidentified drug users. This tale shares a kinship with the origins of
Nevada’s shield statute.
Annette Buchanan was a senior at the University of Oregon when she was named
managing editor of the student newspaper, the Oregon Daily Emerald. On May 22, 1966,
during a coffee run, Buchanan was approached by several students who were concerned
with the lack of balance in several Emerald stories about the spread of drug use on
American college campuses (Smith, 159). “They suggested that the Emerald was antimarijuana and that we wouldn’t print the other side of the story, even if we could get
it” (quoted in Smith, 160). A few days later, the Emerald printed an article under the
headline “Students Condone Marijuana Use.” An editor’s note revealed that “For
obvious reasons, the names used here are not actually those of the students
interviewed” (quoted in Smith, 160). Statements from students interviewed for the piece
included opinions about the hazards of marijuana use. Some students said pot was not the
same as harder drugs. Also expressed was the opinion that people using marijuana are
generally less irresponsible than people under the influence of alcohol. One statement in
particular caught the eye of the local district attorney. A student told the Emerald that he
knew at least 200 people who regularly smoked marijuana.
Coincidentally, the Emerald, in an editorial published a day before Buchanan’s
story ran, endorsed Lane County district attorney William F. Frye’s opponent for election
to the state legislature. Frye was an avid reader of the Emerald; he had also attended the
university and worked as a reporter and editor there before graduating in 1956 (Smith,
158). After reading Buchanan’s story, he consulted with Eugene’s police chief. By June
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3, Buchanan was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury empaneled by Frye
specifically to investigate the Emerald’s pot story. Having fretted over what she would
say all night, the frazzled “girl editor” showed up to the grand jury room and was
confronted by seven jurors and Frye. Asked if she would tell the jurors the names of any
of the students she interviewed for her story, Buchanan refused, saying, “No, I will
not” (quoted in Smith, 163).
Frye immediately went to a nearby judge’s chambers and requested a court order
to compel disclosure, but Buchanan’s attorney successfully argued for a delay in the
proceedings. “I’m not through with you yet,” Frye told the young college editor. By
June 13, the plight of the Emerald’s managing editor was national news. Reporters
flocked to Eugene not just to cover the unfolding drama, but to support Buchanan. Many
even testified on her behalf, arguing that she not only had a First Amendment right to
protect her sources, she had a professional obligation to do so. Frye, for his part, argued
that there was nothing in Oregon’s law providing a testimonial shield for reporters.
“There is no common law, there is no historic right which makes it possible for a
journalist to define under oath to testify” (quoted in Smith, 164).
Buchanan’s attorney argued that Frye had issued his subpoena in bad faith—the
subpoena was characterized as retribution for the editorial endorsing Frye’s opponent;
Frye had lost in the primary election. This argument did not sway the judge, however.
“It will be the order of the court that this witness answer each of the questions put to
her” (quoted in Smith, 164). Buchanan was brought back to the grand jury two days later
and again refused to testify. A contempt charge was filed and she was ordered to appear
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back before the judge. Leading up to the contempt trial, Buchanan was buoyed by an
outpouring of support. Frye took the unusual step of responding to this by penning letters
to the editor in multiple newspapers, explaining that “Sound law enforcement depends
upon the willingness of every citizen who has knowledge of criminal activity to come
forward and to testify if necessary.” Buchanan was held in contempt of court, but spared
jail time. She was fined $300.
The college editor’s attorney announced he would appeal the ruling, citing as one
reason the fact no journalist in Oregon history had ever been held in contempt of court.
Press advocates worried the ruling would embolden prosecutors across the state. Days
after, a lobbying effort began in earnest to shape an Oregon state shield law. Newspapers
and wire services from across the country covered the verdict, employing multiple
rhetorical devices, Smith wrote, in order to sway public opinion and place First
Amendment arguments in the forefront, just as occurred eight years earlier in Garland
(168). Smith wrote that in calling for a state shield law, one editorial, published in the
Oregonian, framed the argument in terms that would be made popular a decade later by
noted constitutional scholar Vincent Blasi. “In a democratic society, the free press is the
watchdog for the public and no such regime has long endured where this was not
so” (cited in Smith, 173).
The Oregon Supreme Court heard arguments in Buchanan’s appeal in December
1967. Less than eight weeks later it issued its judgment: “Nothing in the state or federal
constitution compels the courts, in the absence of a statute, to recognize such a
privilege” (quoted in Smith, 175). The seven-member supreme court went to great
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lengths to explain its decision, taking up both sides of the argument, the winning side
noting arguments similar to those that would be expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision four years later in Branzburg. Smith thoroughly documents the uncanny
resemblance between the state supreme court’s decision in Buchanan and Justice White’s
majority opinion in Branzburg.
It was after Buchanan that legal scholars began seriously examining the
constitutional arguments for and against a testimonial privilege for journalists, building
toward Branzburg in 1972 when the debate reached a crescendo. It should be noted that
the decision in Buchanan coincides to the very year the Reno Evening Gazette decided to
investigate pot smoking on the University of Nevada campus, the same year its editor,
Warren Lerude, would also be threatened with jail if he didn’t turn over the “names of
those felons.”

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Branzburg Decision

Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) involves arguably one of the oddest rulings ever made
by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning press freedoms. Its impact on the reporter’s
privilege debate is unquestionable; it sparked an avalanche of legal and media studies
scholarship. It remains the only time in U.S. history that the nation’s highest court has
addressed the question of whether the First Amendment provides a testimonial privilege
for journalists. Berger (2003) noted that almost 100 federal shield statutes were proposed
within six years of the Branzburg decision (1391). Lee (2006) interpreted the decision in
Branzburg as holding that journalists share “coextensive” constitutional protections with
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the public, rejecting a testimonial privilege for reporters under the First Amendment and
making news gathering an incidental, an even tangential issue (643-645). Easton (2009)
called the Branzburg decision “devastating” to media professionals and the most
influential decision on news gathering ever made by the Supreme Court (1294).
Branzburg was a conglomeration of four federal appellate cases involving three
journalists, Paul Branzburg, Earl Caldwell and Paul Pappas. The case’s namesake was an
investigative journalist for the Louisville Courier-Journal who in 1969, at age 27, earned
the ire of local authorities by publicizing drug use and drug manufacturing in his
community, but refused to divulge the identities of confidential sources who provided
first-hand accounts of engaging in the illegal activity. Branzburg held a law degree from
Harvard University and a masters degree from Columbia University’s journalism school.
He investigated the abuse of narcotics among many other subjects (Easton, 1301). In
November 1969, the Courier-Journal ran a story about two “hippies” making hashish out
of marijuana. The hippies’ identities were withheld by the newspaper. A Jefferson
County, Kentucky grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg, who promptly invoked the state’s
shield law, which protects the “source of any information procured or obtained by him
(journalist), and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station
by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected” (cited in Easton,
1301). Branzburg’s attorney also cited the First Amendment and the state constitution in
arguing for a temporary restraining order from the state appeals court. The argument did
not work in the end, though a temporary restraining order was granted. “Even before the
revised opinion was issued, Branzburg had published two more controversial stories
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based on observations and interviews with Kentucky drug users,” setting up a second
criminal case against the young reporter (1302). Kentucky’s shield law was ruled
inapplicable by the state appeals court because the court ruled the statute only protected
“sources.” It did not apply to the reporter’s personal observations of criminal activity
(Easton, 1319). Branzburg’s petition for review by the United States Supreme Court was
granted on May 3, 1971.
Earl Caldwell became disillusioned by racism in the insurance industry before
becoming a reporter for The Progress in Clearfield, Pennsylvania. That job eventually
landed Caldwell at the New York Times in 1967, where he wrote about race issues
(Easton, 1295). He developed confidential relationships with several members of the
Black Panthers in Oakland and San Francisco. This brought about the scrutiny of federal
authorities—a month of phone calls from the FBI seeking his assistance eventually turned
into three subpoenas seeking his work product and orders to testify before a federal grand
jury (1299). Caldwell kept appealing the subpoenas and orders to testify to the Ninth
Circuit Court. The circuit court vacated a lower court contempt ruling against Caldwell
in November 1970. The court ruled the public’s First Amendment right to be informed
would be jeopardized by forcing a reporter to testify before a grand jury in secret. The
federal government petitioned for Supreme Court certiorari and it was granted on May
3, 1971 (1300).
Paul Pappas was a television reporter and photographer for WTEV-TV in New
Bedford, Massachusetts, working out of the station's office in East Providence, Rhode
Island. On July 30, 1970, he covered a Black Panther leader’s speech. He stayed after
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the speech for an extended period at the Panthers’ local headquarters. Pappas was
summoned to appear before a Bristol County grand jury two months later. He claimed a
First Amendment privilege to decline to answer any questions about what he saw or any
communications he may have had at Panther headquarters that night. When he was
directed to appear before the grand jury again, he filed a motion to quash on First
Amendment grounds because he feared “that any future possibilities of obtaining
information to be used in my work would be definitely jeopardized, inasmuch as I
wouldn't be trusted or couldn't gain anyone's confidence to acquire any information in
reporting the news as it is” (1303). Pappas’ motion was denied by a judge, who noted
Massachusetts did not have a shield law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on
January 29, 1971 refused to follow arguments on Pappas’ behalf, many of which centered
around points also made in the Caldwell case. The court ruled that to follow Caldwell—
who won an unprecedented qualified privilege in the Ninth Circuit—would be akin to
judicial legislating. Petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was granted on
May 3, 1971. Oral arguments were made on February 22, 1972 for Caldwell and the next
day for Pappas and Branzburg.
On June 29, 1972, the Court issued its decision, with Justice Byron R. White
writing the majority opinion. The Ninth Circuit decision in Caldwell was reversed, while
the court upheld the lower court rulings in Branzburg and Pappas. Chief Justice Burger
along with justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined White’s opinion. Justice
Powell, however, wrote a controversial concurring opinion that would later be cited by
multiple circuit courts that eventually fashioned their own qualified privileges. Justice
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Douglas and Justice Stewart wrote dissenting opinions, with justices Brennan and
Marshall joining Stewart. The following quotation perhaps best illustrates Justice
White’s majority opinion:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare.
Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. But these
cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the
press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to
withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal,
related to the content of published material is at issue here. The use of confidential sources by the
press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means
within the law. No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or
indiscriminately to disclose them on request (White in Branzburg, 681-682).

Lee (2006) noted that in addition to their disagreement about the constitutional
significance of news gathering, “Justices White and Stewart offered starkly differing
views of the role of the press in society” (646). To Justice White, a special,
constitutionally mandated position belonged to the grand jury, not the press. “If a
journalist's privilege were to be created, Justice White observed, this was a task for
Congress or state legislatures” (651).
In dissent, Justice Stewart called the majority opinion a “crabbed view of the First
Amendment,” saying the decision “reflects a disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of
an independent press in our society” (Branzburg).
The question whether a reporter has a constitutional right to a confidential relationship
with his source is of first impression here, but the principles that should guide our decision
are as basic as any to be found in the Constitution. While MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S enigmatic
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concurring opinion gives some hope of a more flexible view in the future, the Court in these
cases holds that a newsman has no First Amendment right to protect his sources when called
before a grand jury. The Court thus invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic
independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative
arm of government. Not only will this decision impair performance of the press’ constitutionally
protected functions, but it will, I am convinced, in the long run harm rather than help the
administration of justice (Stewart in Branzburg, 725).

Powell’s “enigmatic” concurring opinion was indeed an odd turn of events. Martin &
Fargo 2013 as well as many other scholars have noted that Powell’s argument created a
doorway for lower circuit courts to entertain the possibility of a qualified reporter’s
privilege. “Through the few cases in which the appellate circuits have dealt directly with
the issue, a loose definition of ‘privileged journalist’ has emerged” (50). In Powell’s
opinion the news gathering process was not “unprotected” by the First Amendment. “If a
newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith
he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information
bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he
has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source
relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the
court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered” (Powell
in Branzburg).
Docter (2010) also reported that numerous lower courts fashioned qualified
privileges in the aftermath of Branzburg. The Tenth Circuit did so five years later in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (1977). The Second Circuit did so in in von Bulow v. von
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Bulow (1987). The First, Third, Ninth and Eleventh circuits all followed suit (Docter,
591, citing Alonzo, 2005; Durity, 2006; In re Special Proceedings, 2004, In re Madden,
1998; Shoen v. Shoen, 1993; United States v. Caporale, 1987). Siegel (2006), by
contrast, chose to focus attention on the circuits that refused to acknowledge a privilege,
even interpreting the same Branzburg decision to deny the existence of one. Siegel noted
that the First Circuit appeared to reverse course In re Special Proceedings, a 2004
decision involving Jim Taricani, a Providence, Rhode Island television reporter who
broadcast evidence being presented to a grand jury conducting a corruption probe.
Taricani refused to tell prosecutors how he obtained the taped evidence, which was under
a protective order, and he was placed on house arrest for six months (In re Special
Proceedings, 2004). The D.C. Circuit also refused to recognize a privilege in the 2005
Valerie Plame affair that ensnared New York Times reporter Judith Miller and Time
Magazine’s Matt Cooper. Miller went to jail for nearly three months for refusing to name
her source. The Seventh Circuit in McKevitt v. Pallasch (2003) also cited Branzburg in
dismissing the invocation of a reporter’s privilege (Siegel, 494-495). Numerous scholars
would later cite these developments as justification for a federal shield law, arguing that,
just like the hodgepodge of protections offered by many state laws, federal circuits now
represented a jumble of inconsistency as well.

Life (and Scholarship) After Branzburg

As noted earlier, in the six years immediately following the Branzburg
decision, federal shield laws were proposed 100 times. The number of states passing
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some form of shield statute also increased as a result of the decision—today every state
has some semblance of a statutory or judicially created protection save perhaps Wyoming
(Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press). A noticeable shift, however, has taken
place since 1972 with regard to the literature. The closer to Branzburg one gets, the more
one sees a concentration by scholars on adjudging how states can best write and pass
statutes that acknowledge a reporter’s privilege. Van Gerpen (1979) is one good example
of this. Van Gerpen exerted considerable effort to outline how one could construct a
workable shield law—choosing qualified versus absolute; defining protected persons,
proceedings covered, materials protected, the circumstances in which a person can be
denied the privilege and other steps (142). The central question Van Gerpen identified is
the definition of protected person: Does the statute define the news person’s relationship
to their employer? Is “news media” defined at all? Are degrees of protection offered
based on the type of media dissemination? Is the status of former journalists defined? Van
Gerpen broke down the three criteria best used to describe how disseminators of
information are related to formal media: “1.) They use a noun such as ‘reporter’ or
‘cameraman.’ This can help exclude freelancers. 2.) They use the term ‘employed by.’ 3.)
They list the functions of the reporter, such as ‘newsgathering’” (143). This structural
method for crafting a shield law appears in many state statutes, including Nevada’s.
The further one moves away from Branzburg, however, a shift in the literature
becomes evident. Scholars slowly embraced what many have come to believe is a
solution to the age-old question at the heart of the reporter’s privilege debate: Just who is
a journalist? In the years after Branzburg, scholars such as Van Gerpen sought out
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structural methods for defining professional reporters so that only a certain group could
attain protection, while others, such as anarchists working for a counterculture
publication, or Black Panthers producing film of clashes with police, would not be
defined as protected persons. This “structural” method, however, has proven so divisive
that many scholars note that the failure to pass a federal shield law—Justice White
invited Congress to do so in his Branzburg opinion—is directly the result of disagreement
over who counts as a “real” journalist deserving protection and who does not. Smith
(2013), Martin & Fargo (2013), Pieroni (2008), Siegel (2006), and others argued that for
a federal shield to work it must be based not on the structural definitions of covered
persons and covered media like those embraced in the 1970s, but on a more “functional”
definition, where the practice of journalism is protected, not the practitioner based on his
or her employment status.
The advent of Internet publishing as well as the rise of citizen journalism have
been major drivers of this trend. Each represents emerging forms of journalism often
unprotected by older shield laws. Model legislation introduced in Congress fails to
address this issue as well. Pieroni (2008) noted the central problem with recent proposed
federal shield statutes sought separately by Congress and the Media Law Resource Center
was they each “endorsed a definition of ‘journalist’ that favors the big players in the
industry, rather than protecting journalism as a process” (819). Ambramowicz (2008)
drew a similar conclusion. Ambramowicz argued that courts should adopt a flexible,
procedural approach to determining the weight given to a reporter’s request to invoke the
testimonial privilege. Did the reporter follow industry guidelines in promising and
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keeping confidentiality? Is the benefit to the public interest, on a case-by-case basis, in
keeping the source confidential evident and supportive of maintaining the privilege?
These are questions Ambramowicz believes courts should weigh. Durity (2006) agreed,
arguing that bloggers are left out even as the news media shifts further and further away
from traditional platforms to increasingly digital methods of disseminating information to
the public. Citing the First Circuit’s decision in Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp. (1998),
Durity agreed with the court, which held that “the medium an individual uses to provide
his investigative reporting to the public does not make a dispositive difference in the
degree of protection accorded to his work.” The court held that as long as the reporter’s
intent was to disseminate information to the public at the outset of the news gathering
process, then protection can be afforded. “These holdings support the theory that
bloggers acting as journalists should not be excluded from protection under the reporter’s
privilege merely because they have selected to use an online-posting format or are not
members of a traditional media outlet” (10). And yet, almost all except the latest state
shield statutes leave bloggers and other types of digital journalists unprotected; this
includes Nevada’s statute. Durity noted that fighting subpoenas is expensive and time
consuming for almost any media operation. Subpoenas threaten to chill independent
journalists or those specialists who fall outside traditional reporter definitions. “The
increasing use of the Internet by journalists to distribute information and by the public to
receive information makes this ambiguity all the more worrisome” (13).
As shall be seen shortly, all of these issues arose in the course of Nevada’s efforts
to pass and then amend its state shield law. The question of who shall be covered by the
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law was an important one for both legislators and news professionals. The debate
surrounding revisions to the law in 1975 were imbued with the very First Amendment
arguments that first surfaced in Garland v. Torre, in State v. Buchanan and later in
Branzburg. And of course, the same concerns that have pushed scholars to focus more on
“functional” aspects of defining protected persons in the law rather than antiquated
“structural methods” led to consideration in 2014 of revisiting Nevada’s shield law.
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CHAPTER 3
NEVADA’S FIRST SHIELD LAW

From Purist to Pragmatist
The front pages of the Reno Evening Gazette throughout 1968 screamed the social
and political upheaval that was gripping Nevada and the nation. On the second day of
that year, a page one headline informed Reno residents that 14 of its citizens had been
arrested on marijuana charges (REG, Jan. 2, 1968, A1). Three days later, news hit the
streets that local brothel owner Joe Conforte had been acquitted of “white slavery”
charges (REG, Jan. 5, 1968, A1). By the end of the month, Washoe County District
Attorney Bill Raggio, who would announce his candidacy for the Republican nomination
for U.S. senator later that year, spoke about the dangers of marijuana and the substance’s
contribution to local crime (REG, Jan. 31, 1968, A1). The Gazette noted the DA’s
observations that criminals use the illicit weed to fortify their criminal courage, that its
use lowers inhibitions, and that chronic users are eventually completely demoralized by
its effects. A February 1, 1968 front page story noted that “Juvenile Narcotics Cases Go
Way Up in Washoe.” By the following month, the Gazette’s Mimi LaPlante wrote about
posing as a Reno High School student for stories about the state of the city’s youth.
While the big news was mostly local at the beginning of 1968, the pace of
national and world events accelerated. By the end of March, President Lyndon Baines
Johnson announced he would not seek a second term. In April, the nation was shocked
when civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. was gunned down in Memphis, leading to
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widespread rioting that also captured the nation’s attention. The shock and despair over
King’s murder had barely subsided when Robert F. Kennedy, the leading candidate to
replace Johnson as president, was slaughtered inside a hotel kitchen in June after winning
the California state primary. His death brought back memories of his brother, President
John F. Kennedy, himself struck down in Dallas by an assassin’s bullet five years earlier.
The catastrophic war in Vietnam also made daily headlines; more than 400,000 had
already been killed in the war, announced one front page story. Hanoi bombing runs and
Paris peace talks joined presidential politics in dominating news as well.
Warren Lerude was a reporter for the Associated Press when he decided to apply
for a reporter position open at the Gazette in 1963. In 1967, Lerude was elevated to the
role of managing editor, virtually running the newspaper’s newsroom. By the end of
1968, the young editor would be scrambling to defuse a threatening showdown with the
local district attorney over a news story: A tip that pot was being smoked on campus led
him to assign a reporter and photographer to get to the bottom of it. It was big news to
him and to the community. The university, after all, was a beer-drinking school (Lerude,
2014).
Lerude told this author almost a half-century later that he always had considered
himself a First Amendment purist—a devout believer that the Constitution’s free press
clause protected his ability to gather and disseminate news. State shield laws, he
believed, forced journalists into potentially compromising positions vis a vis state
legislatures (Lerude, 2014). Because politics is often measured by give and take, he
believed journalists should not ask lawmakers for favors. By the end of 1968, however,
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the new editor was contemplating a mad dash to get a state shield law pushed through the
upcoming 1969 state legislature. Lerude said reality had forced his transformation from
purist to pragmatist.
The district attorney, Bill Raggio, had taken notice of the story about pot-smoking
college kids on the University of Nevada campus. Lerude remembered a photo
accompanied the story; it silhouetted the students, who were not identified. Raggio told
Lerude he wanted the identities “of those felons” captured in the photo. Lerude said he
refused the DA’s request, telling Raggio in no uncertain terms that “those felons”
happened to be the children of the same people who elected him to office. Raggio told
the editor that a local district court judge might not agree with those sentiments. He
further told Lerude that he and his reporters could face jail for refusing to identify the
paper’s sources for the story.
Indeed, unlike today, where multiple states, including Nevada, have legalized the
use of marijuana for medicinal purposes—Colorado and Washington legalized
recreational pot use in 2014—and where metropolitan and rural areas alike are awash in
street drugs of all sorts, drug abuse in 1968 was itself newsworthy. The use of illegal
drugs was a national phenomenon. Actor Cary Grant’s LSD trips made the March 21
front page of the Gazette. In the September 18 issue, a story ran on the second page
under the headline: “University No Sanctuary For Drug Users: Dean.” A slammer
headline across the top of the front page in the October 4 Gazette quoted a local drug
counselor: “Some young drug users are beyond my help.” The October 18 issue carried a
story on A1 about John Lennon’s arrest in London on drug possession charges. The
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November 6 issue carried a story on its front page reporting that 75 percent of narcotics
cases prosecuted by Raggio’s office were eventually dropped. Stories of drug use were as
ubiquitous on the front pages of Reno’s evening newspaper in 1968 as were tales of
Vietnam skirmishes, political assassinations, hippies and protest marches.
Lerude did not like the thought of jail—or of revealing the names of college kids,
who really could face felony-level criminal penalties at the time for possessing any
amount of cannabis. After the threat from Raggio, Lerude contacted the California
Newspaper Publishers Association in Sacramento for help. He sought to quickly copy
California’s state shield statute and have someone quietly introduce a bill during the 1969
Nevada State Legislature. Luckily, he had a fellow newsman in State Sen. Warren L.
“Snowy” Monroe, a Democrat from Elko who served in the state senate from 1958 until
1976.
Monroe was not just a politician, he was also publisher of the Elko Independent, a
newspaper he bought after graduating from the University of Nevada in 1929 (Las Vegas
Review-Journal, April 3, 1987, online archive). Monroe was nicknamed “Snowy”
because of his white hair. He was a long-serving figure in state politics, having first won
election to the Nevada Assembly in 1940. He won reelection in 1942, but World War II
forced him to leave his seat the following year. Monroe returned to the lower house in
1946 and was elected to the Nevada Senate in 1958. The senator died in 1987, one day
after announcing in his “Hot Copy” column in the Independent that he had contracted
pneumonia. In 1969, “Snowy” Monroe’s help was sought in getting a state shield law
introduced, getting it passed, and doing it all with as little fanfare as possible. Lerude did
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not like asking for favors from legislators, first, and he believed publicity could hinder
passage of a bill as well.

For The Record

According to its official legislative history, Senate Bill 299 was introduced by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on February 28, 1969. Monroe was chairman of that
committee. The official history notes that the bill originated as bill draft request 4-1630
(See Appendix B, Senate History, 55th Session, p. 102). When the Senate Judiciary
Committee took up SB299 on March 4, Monroe called it the “Shield Bill.” Russ
McDonald, a legislative counsel, explained “there were several like bills, California,
Kansas, and several other states have it. This stresses the Right of Free Press rather than
the theory of confidential relationship” (See Appendix C). Monroe stated the law would
aid the press in “digging out information.” The minutes record a senator saying the
language of the original was “too broad” regarding who would earn the protection.
McDonald said he would change the language. The minutes record that “Senator Young
felt the newspapers kept a lot people honest as they didn’t want to be publicly known
they weren’t. He respects the powers of the press” (Appendix C).
McDonald promised to review the bill’s language—particularly with regard to
covered persons—and was to get back to the committee. On March 7, the body
reconvened and Monroe remarked that McDonald had fixed the “employed by” language,
advising that “this would cover the publisher, editor, reporter or other employees of the
newspaper.” The bill was passed out of committee. By design, according to Lerude, the
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committee was also taking up SB290 at the same time. That bill required a demand for
retraction in instances of libel or slander. Lerude said both bills were introduced at the
same time on purpose; both mimicked existing California law.
The libel bill was introduced to replace an antiquated “right of reply” law on the
books that most legislators did not even know existed (Lerude, 2014). Lerude believed
both bills were risky endeavors—the politicians could seize upon the right of reply law
and use it as a tool against the media and could also refuse to enact a shield law, thus
officially depriving journalists of an important tool for investigative reporting (Lerude,
2014). According to the March 31, 1969 Assembly Judiciary Committee minutes, Reno
Evening Gazette reporter Vicki Nash was at this meeting—she was covering the new libel
bill, not the shield statute (Lerude, 2014). However, she managed to comment for the
record on SB299, according to the meeting minutes. “The trend today is to train reporters
to have positive statements based on fact and then there will be no grounds for trouble.
Our newspapers and wire services have fits if you quote ‘undisclosed sources,’” she told
the committee (See Appendix E). It should be noted that among the few to comment
regarding SB299 was future U.S. Senate majority leader Harry Reid, who in 1969 was a
young state assemblyman. The minutes note he said of the proposal: “This bill has
merit.” Fellow legislator Torvinen, however, beyond expressing a concern over the broad
protection being offered by the bill’s language, voiced another worry: “This kind of
legislation encourages sloppy reporting. Just say an undisclosed source. If you are a
public figure you don’t have a cause of action anyway” (See Appendix E).
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This sparsely populated record confirms Lerude’s assertions that the shield law
was set to pass quietly. No mention of Raggio’s threats or the Gazette’s news item about
pot-smoking college kids are to be found in any of the state records related to SB299. It
would no doubt have been scandalous if the real reason a shield law was being sought
was to protect the identities of kids smoking pot at the University of Nevada. The bill
was successfully ushered through the state legislature, passing the senate 18-2 (Journal of
the Senate, 1969, p. 338) and the assembly 30-4. Torvinen was among the nays, with six
others absent (Journal of the Assembly, 1969, p. 798). The bill was delivered to the
governor on April 14. Despite the success, a Saturday morning phone call to Lerude
nearly derailed the effort (Lerude, 2014).
Governor Paul Laxalt was in the midst of signing legislation when he came across
SB299. He must have known the bill originated somehow with Lerude. The governor
perhaps even knew the whole story, though it is unclear if that is the case. Lerude
recalled the morning phone call. He said the governor told him the bill would not be
signed. Lerude could not recall why Laxalt was against the bill, but he remembered
making a forceful case for it that morning over the telephone: “We have to have this,”
Lerude recalled telling the governor (Lerude, 2014). Finally, the governor relented,
saying he would sign the bill against his better judgment. Lerude pulled it off. Nevada
had a shield law, and an absolute one at that.
Laxalt left the governor’s mansion in 1971. He would serve two terms as a U.S.
senator. In 1975, Lerude returned to the state legislature to push for revisions to the
shield statute. Unlike in 1969, Lerude arranged for a coterie of journalists to testify.
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Publicity also attended the bill’s introduction, with newspapers around the state printing
editorials in favor of a revised law. It was also during legislative hearings in 1975 on the
matter that Lerude briefly hinted at the origins of the state’s shield law for the first time in
public (See Appendix K). Lerude said he arranged for legislators to hear firsthand from
reporters who had been jailed and whose work created legal entanglements for
themselves (Lerude, 2014). Among the journalists who testified on behalf of revising
Nevada’s statute was a California journalist who at the time held the record for the most
days spent in jail by a reporter for refusing to identify a confidential source.
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CHAPTER 4
MAKING A CASE FOR REVISION

The Branzburg Decision Spurs Action
Assemblyman Steve Coulter introduced AB381 in the 58th session of the Nevada
Assembly in the spring of 1975. A former TV journalist and university instructor, Coulter
would serve four terms in the state Assembly. He would later spend 20 years with Pacific
Bell in San Francisco, retiring as a vice president at the company (Tahoe Daily Tribune,
May 9, 2006, online). In 1975, Coulter was the point person for guiding a revised shield
bill through the state legislature. He urged his fellow legislators to pass the revision,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Branzburg. Coulter was
first to speak when the Assembly Judiciary Committee convened on March 27. Reading
from a prepared statement, he said, “Up until June of 1972, there would have been little
need for … something called a shield law. Until then, the First Amendment to the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press was generally considered inviolate” (See
Appendix H).
Coulter was joined by eight others, mostly journalists, who advocated AB381’s
passage. Joining the assemblyman were Lerude, Dean Smith of the Reno Newspapers,
Inc., Karen McDaniels of Sigma Delta Chi, John Huether, Reno Newspapers, Mark E.
Oliva, Reno Newspapers, Bill Farr, of the Los Angeles Times, Ron Einstoss from the
Visalia Times-Delta, and Tad Dunbar of KOLO-TV. Coulter began by passing around his
legislation and told the committee that he had heard from many journalists around the
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state who supported the bill (See Appendix H). He also commented that news people are
sometimes the only link between politicians and the public. One initial question Coulter
was asked by the committee was why a former newsperson needed protection. Farr and
his experience earning the distinction of being the American journalist to serve more jail
time than any for refusing to divulge a source’s identity was the answer. Farr, whose
record was broken in 2001, served 46 days in jail in 1972; as a reporter he was shielded
by California law, but once he left the newspaper, he was not. According to the minutes,
Lerude spoke next. He started by suggesting that reporters rely on confidential sources of
information on which to base stories and that if those sources could not be protected, they
would dry up. He then gave examples, including a prepared statement, which will be
explored later. Lerude also passed out to the committee a booklet titled “Freedom of the
Press—the Threats and the Washington Post.” Lerude noted that seven states had so far
passed shield laws, though there were more than that on the books. He also said the
shield was not so much a privilege as it was a protection of the public’s right to know
(See Appendix H).
Mark Oliva, a reporter with the Reno Evening Gazette and Nevada State Journal,
spoke next, followed by Farr. Farr told the committee of his numerous confrontations
with authorities during his coverage of the Charles Manson trial. Farr told the committee
that AB381 closed loopholes and that reporters should not face jail for simply doing their
job. Ron Einstoss, who was managing editor of the Visalia Times-Delta at the time, was
instrumental in bringing Farr up to testify. Einstoss was also an alumnus of the
University of Nevada’s journalism school. He was a member of a team of Los Angeles
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Times reporters awarded a Pulitzer Prize for coverage of the 1966 Watts riots. Einstoss
was also Farr’s successor at the Times. Tad Dunbar, a newsman for KOLO-TV, also
spoke. Dunbar said he wanted to provide the committee the television reporter’s
perspective. He said a revised shield law was not just needed to protect the “high-level,
national attention-getting” stories, but that the protection is necessary for smaller, local
newsmen as well. He said the broader the bill the better (See Appendix H). The
Assembly committee meeting minutes do not reflect any other testimony. However,
attached to the minutes are multiple written statements that reveal even deeper feelings
about the need for a revised statute.
Coulter’s written statement opened with a statement about how the public is
concerned with honesty in government (See Appendix J). He wrote that without reporters
doing their jobs, perhaps more politicians would be more concerned with conducting
their own business instead of the public’s. “And no one would probably ever know” (See
Appendix J). “Throughout much of this nation’s history, the news media has been
exposing wrongdoing in government, labor and business. The exposure that results often
leads to criminal prosecutions or reforms to prevent future abuses. But the source of this
information is often the disgruntled employee who passes on information—confidentially
—to journalists. If the source feels the journalist might be forced to reveal his sources, he
won’t talk. Certainly on occasion the press has abused its authority. But overall, I think
it has served the country well,” he wrote (See Appendix J).
Coulter’s letter reiterates his feeling that had it not been for the decision in
Branzburg, there would be little need for a state shield law. “Then the U.S. Supreme
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Court, in a 5-4 vote, did its own editing job on the First Amendment and ruled that a
newsman had no right to refuse to reveal his confidential sources to a grand jury. But at
the same time, the high court virtually invited Congress to enact newsmen’s shield
legislation. Congress is still debating the question, but over half the states have taken up
the challenge. Nevada has been one of them, he wrote. Coulter argued that the current
law in Nevada was similar to other states’. He said the changes he proposed were similar
to what California did to “meet obvious shortcomings in the law.” He wrote that AB381
proposes two major changes: 1.) Extend protection to former newsmen. 2.) Protect the
newsman’s tools, such as notes, photos, tape recordings and similar items. “To force a
reporter to reveal his notes from an interview is often about the same thing as forcing him
to name his source,” he wrote.
Coulter shared some responses to his effort from newsmen around the state. Cal
Sunderland, editor of the Humboldt Sun in Winnemucca, wrote, “ Your AB381 bill to
amend Nevada’s shield law has my wholehearted support and I trust the legislature will
enact it without delay.” The Nevada State Journal published an editorial in support:
“Such strengthening is important to newsmen and public alike. The mere act of resigning
from a news position should certainly not strip former newsmen of their shield rights for
stories covered by newsmen. And photographs, films and tape recordings are often as
much a part of the reporter’s trade as his notebooks.” The editorial also stated, “The law
is vital to the public because newsmen are frequently the only window on hidden or illicit
people and situations. It’s a window that could be shut on the public if shield laws do not
remain strong.” A.D. Hopkins Jr., a former investigative reporter with the Las Vegas
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Review-Journal, was managing editor of the Valley Times in North Las Vegas in 1975.
He wrote to Coulter about the potential issues faced by former Las Vegas journalists:
“The need … is great in Las Vegas because of the large number of newsmen who enter
other businesses, such as hotel public relations, and who may then be subject to
subpoenas, perhaps politically inspired subpoenas. It should be noted that in a state as
small as Nevada, with small circulation newspapers, even cub reporters may handle
blockbuster stories.” John Howe, KOLO-TV news director, is recorded in Coulter’s
written statement saying, “Often, when the public needs protection (as from its own
government) the best sources are often afraid to be identified. If such people think the
reporter is legally unable to protect them, they won’t talk.” Coulter also shared a portion
of a Review-Journal editorial, which stated, “This kind of law is essential so the public
can read accurate, in-depth articles about sensitive topics. Newsmen often are the only
link the public has with situations that politicians wish would remain hidden. Newsmen
must be protected from vindictive officials or juries. And photographs, tape recordings
and films must be kept confidential, all in the line of protecting sources who provide so
many inside stories.” The editorial continued, “In order to gather news, reporters must
feel they won’t be harassed later by grand juries and courts. Even when they quit news
jobs, their shield rights should remain with them. We urge passage of AB381 for all the
people.”
Lerude also submitted a written statement (See Appendix K). He introduced it
with a description of a recent story that relied on confidential sources—a right-to-work
state initiative—that could have serious implications for Nevada. “So, there you have the
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need for Assembly Bill 381—the reporters either get certain kinds of information on a
confidential basis or the public doesn’t get the news. Confidentiality is, simply put, a
working tool of the news reporter and the news source who, together, get information to
the public.” Lerude then listed a series of other news stories that depended upon
confidential sources. A Reno councilman’s firm obtained $40,000 in real estate
commission from vice figure Joe Conforte in a controversial land deal, for instance. The
City of Reno planned secret negotiations with airlines on landing fees, already among the
lowest in the United States, was the focus of another. There were also news stories
involving serious problems with a highway overpass under construction in Reno. Also,
“alien movements” toward Las Vegas and their connection with Mafia activities were the
focus of other stories that utilized confidential sources. Stories about Reno’s city
government being unable to account for thousands of dollars in parking tickets and pieces
highlighting the lack of security at the Nevada State Hospital were also mentioned as
being impossible news items without the assistance of confidential sources. “These
major stories are but a few of the thousands printed by newspapermen in the state as a
result of confidential sources coming forward with information. These stories can be
obtained only by an independent press,” Lerude wrote.
Lerude’s written statement also cited the Watergate scandal and subsequent
resignation of President Nixon as an example of potential threats to press independence.
“But imagine for one moment the disruption in that public service—journalism—if
President Nixon and/or the Committee to Re-elect the President had been successful in
obtaining the notes and background information being used by the probing reporters of
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the Washington Post. All the President’s men could have stayed one step ahead of the
pursuing reporters and the coverup might never have been uncovered.” Buried deep in
his written statement, Lerude then relayed the unknown history of the original Nevada
shield law. The Reno Evening Gazette had grappled with how to expose drug use among
younger people to the public. Young people were smoking pot and then some were
getting into heavier drugs, such as speed, heroin and LSD. The newspaper interviewed
all the stakeholders in the community, Lerude wrote, including legal, medical and
education professionals as well as parents and young people. “Including pot smokers,
who told us their story on a confidential basis.” He wrote that he knew that if the story
were to be the most truthful “we would have to go to the offenders and get their views.”
“The district attorney at that time quickly reminded me that the marijuana smoking
sources of ours were criminals, felons. And the district attorney told me he could seek
out the names of those criminal/sources of ours. And should we, as newspapermen,
refuse to reveal our sources, we could end up in jail.” Without mentioning the role he
played in helping get the original shield bill introduced, Lerude also quoted Sen. Warren
“Snowy” Monroe. “This makes it possible for newspaper people to obtain information
more readily and under the protection that they don’t have to place their sources in
jeopardy.”
Oliva provided the committee with a written statement as well (See Appendix M).
“In passing Nevada Revised Statute 49.275 as it now exists, the state legislature affirmed
its belief that the public is entitled to an unimpeded flow of information,” he wrote. He
argued in his statement that a shield law that protects a journalist from providing
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compelled testimony, but still allows police or prosecutors to rifle through his files in
search of information, “isn’t much of a shield law at all.” Oliva also argued that the press
acts as a buffer between officials and the public and that “to keep channels open” a strong
shield law was necessary. The reporter also urged lawmakers to view the shield law’s
protections as not conveying a special privilege upon the press, but as a needed protection
of the public’s right to be informed. “God help us if we ever pass laws to protect the
press or any other special interest group,” he wrote. Oliva told legislators that during his
12-year career, he’d been subpoenaed nine times—seven before trial courts and twice by
grand juries. In his written statement, he listed a number of stories he has written that he
could only complete with the help of confidential sources. Among these were a 1961
story that exposed postal bribery attempts by the aide of a Wisconsin governor. In 1970
he was able to demonstrate that the developer of a controversial land project had given
money to three county supervisors, one of whom was later indicted. In 1971 he
demonstrated how a grand juror had used a phony investigative report to convince other
grand jurors that an upstanding public official was guilty of dereliction of duty. In 1974
he pieced together a fraud orchestrated in Switzerland and the Bahamas that was selling
worthless desert land to duped European investors. “More recently and more specifically,
in Nevada, I was able to tell how members of the Santo Trafficante organized crime
family are attempting to set up a cocaine distribution system in the Las Vegas area, and
how initial attempts are being made to infiltrate the Culinary Workers Union,” he wrote.
Einstoss also provided a written statement to lawmakers (See Appendix L). He
wrote that prior to joining this newspaper, he spent more than 10 years covering the Los
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Angeles County criminal courts, district attorney’s office and grand jury for the Los
Angeles Times. A University of Nevada, Reno alumnus, Einstoss made a number of
similar arguments for revising Nevada’s shield law as other witnesses. “The right of
confidentiality,” he wrote, “cannot be denied to the unpublished portion of a reporter’s
notes or the unused portion of a cameraman’s film without violating the basis of
confidentiality which underlies Nevada’s existing shield law.” He noted to legislators a
common practice among journalists, of promising confidentiality in order to gain
information and insight, even if not all of the information makes its way into a news
story. “When a source of information is not able to feel that his trust in the reporter is
complete, there can only be a chilling effect on the flow of vital information to the
public.” Einstoss also told lawmakers that he did not know how journalists could
maintain confidential sources if the state’s shield law didn’t also protect a reporter’s notes
and work product, unless the journalist simply destroyed the information after use, which
would deprive him of important reference material for future articles. Einstoss also made
an argument for how smaller newspapers can be most negatively affected when reporters
find themselves engaged in court battles with authorities. “Fighting these threats can
jeopardize the economic health of small newspapers—like the Times-Delta and many of
those you have in Nevada,” he wrote. If a lengthy legal “donnybrook” awaits the pursuit
of certain stories, then legislators can bet no small newspaper will risk its financial
survival to pursue them, he wrote. “Just as you, legislators, must retain the confidence of
your constituents, newspapers—large and small—must keep the confidence of their
readers.”
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The Nevada Assembly Judiciary Committee passed AB381 with minor
amendments on April 9, 1975 (See Appendix H). A second reading of the bill was done
on April 14. A roll call vote commenced and the bill passed out of the Assembly 27 yeas
to seven nays. Two legislators were absent and four did not cast votes. The bill was
introduced in the Senate on April 17. The next day it moved to the Committee on
Judiciary.
The Senate Judiciary Committee met on May 1. The meeting minutes show that,
“Assemblyman Steve Coulter appeared on behalf of this bill. He informed the
Committee that this will (sic) extends the newsmen’s shield law to former newsmen for
stories they were involved in before the law was in effect and it will also cover the
newsman’s tools, such as notes, tape recordings, photographs, etc” (See Appendix I).
Coulter told the committee of the Assembly Judiciary Committee’s extensive hearings on
the revised law. The Senate committee immediately passed the bill with little discussion.
The bill was read a second time in the full Senate on the same day and ordered for third
reading. On May 2, the bill was read for third time, with remarks by Sen. Warren
Monroe and another senator. A roll call vote was held. The bill passed 17-1, with two
senators absent (64). On the 106th day of the 58th Nevada Legislature, AB381 returned
to the Assembly after passage in the Senate. It was formally passed on May 7, 1975. It
was signed by the governor shortly thereafter.
The law sits on the books unchanged after almost four decades, unchallenged in
the courts, but dusty and antiquated compared to efforts in other states where legislators
have updated their statutes to reflect a much different media landscape than existed just
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after Branzburg. Nevada policymakers flirted briefly with modernization in 2014, to no
avail.
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CHAPTER 5
AN ATTEMPT AT MODERNIZATION

A Road Less Travelled
Like many public policies on the books across the country, Nevada’s shield law is
more representative of a bygone era. It is antiquated and in need of reform, if merely to
reconfirm the state’s commitment to a free and independent press, and to update the
statute’s protections to include more modern forms of information dissemination.
Scholarly work regarding the reporter’s privilege always appears alongside major
events involving the news media. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Branzburg led to an avalanche of legal scholars studying the meaning of the decision as
well as its consequences. Then in the mid-2000s, particularly with the jailing of New
York Times reporter Judith Miller, another spate of high-level thinking surrounding the
reporter’s privilege took place. And in this latter era, scholars came to believe that
previous work on the subject was all wrong—many have now concluded that a misguided
adherence to defining protections based on the employment status of journalists, where
traditional big media trump all, has actually hindered efforts to formulate a national
policy. This has repeatedly been the case for 80 years. Durity (2006), Ugland &
Henderson (2007), Docter (2010), Robben (2012), Martin & Fargo (2013), and Smith
(2013) are all examples from the literature that reflect this growing sentiment among
legal scholars. All embraced the idea that many state statutes are simply outdated and in
need of revision to reflect a more modern media landscape.
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Nevada policymakers are not ignorant of this trend. In April 2014, a
subcommittee of the Nevada Attorney General’s Technological Crime Advisory Board
examined updating the Nevada shield law in order to make it more inclusive for onlineonly media professionals as well as updating the law’s language, bringing it in line with
recommendations by such groups as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (See
Appendix O). The goal of the project was to deliver to legislators a revised version of the
state’s shield law that did what modern legal scholars agree should be done—enact
language that protects journalism as a function, instead of protecting traditional structures
at the peril of journalists working outside traditional media. This next installment of
shield law history, unfortunately, may turn out to be just a footnote.
The Technical Privacy Subcommittee was formed on Sept. 5, 2013. Nevada
Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto named her appointments to the committee on
Oct. 18. The mission of this group was to make recommendations as well as monitor
changes in international, federal, and state policy and legislation involving privacy
protections. The group also was to serve as advisors relating to technology in Nevada,
including how medical, financial, location, and communication data were being utilized
(See Appendix N). The members of this group were University of Nevada Las Vegas
computer science professor Hal Berghel, chair of the group; Stephen Bates, a University
of Nevada Las Vegas journalism professor; Dennis Cobb, consultant and former deputy
chief of the Las Vegas Metro Police Department; James Earl, Cyber Counsel for the State
of Nevada; James Elste, CEO of Cognitive Extension, Inc.; Allen Lichtenstein, then
general counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada; and Ira Victor, a
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digital forensic examiner at Data Clone Labs. Bates and Lichtenstein collaborated on the
proposal to refashion Nevada’s shield law.

New Language for a New Era

According to the April 17, 2014 meeting minutes of the privacy subgroup, Bates
and Lichtenstein had already made some headway in crafting new language for a revised
shield statute. However, it also appeared the pair had already encountered some push
back, even if only slight at that point. “There is kind of a ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t break it’
feeling,” Lichtenstein remarked during the meeting (See Appendix O). Member Elste is
recorded in the minutes as showing the proposed revised shield law to an Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) representative. They called the language one of the more
“rock solid” laws that they had seen. Elste also shared that the EFF consultant approved
of the more functional language in the proposed revisions: “One of probably the most
important pieces of feedback and one that I think will bear some discussion for our group
is that they look at the type of information that is covered and who does that apply to.
From EFF’s perspective, it is the functional definition of journalism that’s more important
than a status definition of journalism. I believe what we have in the current language, is
you have to be a certain type of journalist to be covered as opposed to looking strictly
speaking at the act of journalism” (See Appendix O).
Elste described the language in Nevada’s current shield law as a “series of labels,”
dictating protection for certain people. Upon hearing how some state statutes do not
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provide protections for book authors—recall in 2001 author Vanessa Leggett surpassed
the record set by Bill Farr in 1972 for number of days spent in jail for refusing to divulge
a source’s identity—Elste said he understood the conceptual rationale for Nevada to
revise its statute. “I think that one really resonated for me because an unpublished author
who is doing investigative journalism or producing a book that is using investigative
techniques may well need the same sort of protection,” he said. The group adjourned the
meeting with an agreement that Bates would rework the language in the revision and also
provide the group with some examples of successful, if not more modern, shield statutes
on the books in other states.
The privacy subcommittee next met on May 30. Another version of a revised
Nevada statute was handed out (See Appendices Q and R). Bates opened the discussion
by reminding the group that a functional approach was being made in the wording,
“rather than an employment-based approach” (See Appendix P). He also mentioned
adding language that would penalize abuse of process by authorities who may leverage
legal costs in order to force compliance. Also, language was proposed that would require
notice be served on journalists prior to law enforcement serving subpoenas on a reporter’s
phone records or other third-party information. The group discussed a 2010 National
Security Agency whistleblower case, the Thomas Drake affair. Drake leaked sensitive
information about the NSA’s domestic spying to a Baltimore Sun reporter. After the brief
detour, the subcommittee members discussed whether a revised shield statute would be
ready by Sept. 2, when the attorney general would need to send her office’s bill draft
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requests to the legislature. Berghel wondered aloud if “this shield law is potentially ready
for prime time.”
From the audience, Barry Smith, president of the Nevada Press Association,
chimed in on the discussion. Far from Lerude’s passion in 1968, Smith informed the
group that his clients—the state’s newspaper industry—were “nervous to be touching the
Shield Law at all” (See Appendix P). “I’m contradicting myself (Smith basically agreed
with the group’s conceptual analysis) and I would advise them that this is (the) way we
ought to be going but I’m just telling you that I won’t have a unanimous response to
that,” he warned the group. Berghel asked Smith what he thought the group should do to
assuage the industry’s fears. “We are, after all, trying to do this for the journalists in the
state,” the chair said.
Smith explained how the law already covers the majority of members of the
state’s press association. Since they were already covered, most would not want to risk
the protections already available to them, he warned. Berghel finally asked: “Barry, are
you more nervous about touching the statute than you are about the substance of the
draft?” “Yes, definitely,” Smith answered. Berghel confided that he saw Smith’s point:
“OK, that’s an important consideration because once the legislature decides to deal with
something, they can decide that (they) don’t believe in shield laws and just revoke the
whole thing.” The conversation continued among the group. Earl said he believed that if
the issue were recast as economic opportunity for the state to attract bloggers who enjoy
the protections of Nevada’s better shield protections, then legislators would be more apt
to listen. Elste said he would reject language penalizing process abuse and simply stick
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with First Amendment arguments. Responding to Smith, Elste said the proposed revised
shield statute goes far in advancing journalism in the state. “It would be a shame not to
have the press association shoulder to shoulder with us at the table,” he said.

The Industry Balks

The May draft of Bates and Lichtenstein’s revised shield law was approved by
vote of the privacy subcommittee to be taken up by the next meeting of the attorney
general’s Technological Crime Advisory Board. That meeting occurred on June 5 (See
Appendix S). Berghel opened the discussion by explaining the issues to the board.
“Modern journalism is no longer restricted to the traditional journalistic employers,” he
told the board. He also cited the Branzburg decision and said that without a federal
shield law, “It’s left to the states to protect journalism . . . We propose that the already
excellent Nevada statute be further enhanced.” Berghel went on to explain the functional
approach to the language: “It’s worded in such a way that we don’t have to be technology
focused because by the time we get the new statute passed, the technology will have
changed again. We’ve endeavored in this proposed statute revision to expand the
coverage on the basis of the function of the journalist not the particular manner or means
by which they apply their journalistic skills.” James Owens, a Las Vegas Metro Police
deputy chief, asked whether a blogger or anyone who posts online, would be shielded and
Berghel answered, perhaps too hastily, in the affirmative. Owens quickly said he could
not support any legislation that allowed that. The press association’s Smith was then
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asked his opinion, and he dutifully repeated that 90 percent of his association’s
membership was already covered by the existing law and so “our point of view is that we
are kind of hesitant to touch it.”
After considering the shield law revisions as well as a number of other privacy
and technology related issues, the board’s chairwoman, Attorney General Masto,
described her feelings about the board dealing with proposed legislation. She believed
that legislators on the board who believed strongly in a proposal should take up those
causes on their own. Traditionally, she said, “if they are interested in moving forward
with any legislation or any issue that comes before this Board, they usually will handle it
and move it forward at their own direction and discretion.” The shield law revisions as
well as two other items—proposed legislation to include a privacy rights clause in
Nevada’s constitution and a proposal asking Nevada’s congressional delegation to
support better online privacy rights under federal law—were put on hold. Law
enforcement concerns and lackluster support from the Nevada Press Association appear
to have played an outsized role in this outcome.
When the privacy subcommittee next met on Aug. 29, the members were
disappointed that three of their four recommendations to the Technological Crime
Advisory Board had been abandoned (See Appendix T). Elste told the other members
that he was concerned that the subcommittee had spent the better part of a year on
proposals and had pulled together a group with expertise in the field. The minutes record
him stating that with three of the proposals tabled, he was worried that the group may feel
their efforts were not appreciated and their time better spent elsewhere.The group then
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entered into a long discussion into its statutory duties and whether it should even be
associated with the technological crime board. Other subjects were addressed, and the
new shield law the group had worked so diligently on faded from conversation.
Modernization would have to wait.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

A Profound Policy Statement
“No reporter or editorial employee of any newspaper, periodical, press association
or radio or television station may be required to disclose the source of any information
procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation.”
This is a profound policy statement, crafted and ushered through the Nevada state
legislature in 1969 with little fanfare and no publicity. The telling of the history behind
this particular policy has never been done before, and according to one recently published
study, Smith (2013), such histories are noticeably absent from the privilege literature,
including over the span of the entire 113-year existence of state efforts to enact shield
statutes (43). Smith called this material important in order to shed light on the
development of such statutory policy. “The little scholarship there is hints at the role that
journalists, press advocates and the public have played in helping to shape the direction
of the law” (43). Smith and others have advocated the types of statutory shield laws that
advance First Amendment values, just as Nevada’s clearly does. Smith concluded that
statutory law should be placed in an elevated role, “not merely as a second-best workaround, but as a valuable outlet for the people to express what their Constitution means to
them.”
For Lerude, he was a First Amendment purist up until 1968; his deep-rooted belief
was that the Constitution protected his ability to gather news without government
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interference. When that appeared untenable, he did what Smith predicts has happened in
many state legislatures—he took it upon himself, with the help of others, to shape public
policy in a way that enshrined his belief in the importance of an independent press to the
proper functioning of a democratic society. Of course, public input on this policy
statement was non-existent in 1969, which does raise questions about whether the lack of
transparency in the process jibes with any assertion that fundamental democratic values
were at play.
The lack of transparency in 1969 was certainly made up for in 1975. Repeatedly
throughout their testimony in that year, Lerude, Oliva, Einstoss, Farr and others invoked
traditional First Amendment principles—the free flow of information, the public’s right to
be informed, self-governance, the press’ checking function—to buttress their arguments.
They also cited the inability of Congress to pass its own shield law, and, of course, the
decision in Branzburg, which left many states scrambling to pass shield statutes in
response. It certainly weighed heavily in Assemblyman Coulter’s rationale for revising
the Nevada shield law. It was the 1970s, as well, with Watergate intrigues mixing with
Church Committee revelations and Rockefeller Commission horrors, all lifting the veil on
American political machinations that bore slight resemblance to the America most people
thought they knew, loved and understood. The strengthening of Nevada’s shield law, one
could argue, is reflective, perhaps reactive, to the shocking state of affairs that marked the
1960s and 1970s. This time it unquestionably was an open and honest exercise in
democratic processes.
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But what a difference 39 years makes. In 2014, when a small group, representing
academia, the business community and law enforcement met to propose a more modern,
more fair revised shield statute, the effort was stymied from the start, and startlingly by
the very industry the group sought to protect. The Nevada Press Association essentially
reported that while most of its membership is covered by Nevada’s already strong shield
statute, the industry would be loathe to tinker with what is not broken. That thinking,
perhaps, is sadly a missed opportunity to prepare the foundations today for the practice of
journalism tomorrow. It is also patently unfair to the men and woman who perform the
same functions as television and newspaper reporters but do so for an online audience,
through blogs and podcasts. Asked what he thought about including bloggers in
protections extended to traditional media outlets, Lerude said, “Of course bloggers should
be protected.” But, alas, they are not. It is as if Nevada’s shield law has come full circle,
marked by an opaque process in the beginning, revised vibrantly in 1975, and yet left to
the erosion of time by policymakers in 2014, almost guaranteeing a scenario in some
future date when a person performing the functions of a journalist will do so unprotected
simply because they do not work for a large corporation, or in a format specifically cited
by the law.
It was disappointing to see nowhere in the privacy subcommittee meeting minutes
of the group proposing a revised shield statute in 2014 any mention of the fact that
Nevada’s information apparatus—the traditional news media—teeters on the brink of
irrelevance, thanks to endless cost-cutting and lay offs. Such shrinkage marks most
traditional U.S. media markets. Consolidation and layoffs are as much a part of the
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industry as good journalism anymore. Most people’s newspapers are shells of their
former selves. More than 20 people were laid off at the Las Vegas Review-Journal in
2011 and 13 more in 2013. In 2009, its only local competitor, the Las Vegas Sun, laid off
40 people. In 2011, the Sun cut an additional dozen more staffers (Friess, 2011, Stutz,
2011, Mitchell, 2014). And as the industry’s footing further deteriorates, the public no
doubt will shift farther and farther away from traditional outlets to other platforms.
The Pew Research Journalism Project noted in 2014 that while traditional news
outlets continue to trim staffs and shrink page counts, online-only media brands such as
BuzzFeed, ProPublica, Mashable and Vox Media—the kinds of digital news outlets that
will populate the media landscape when the death knell sounds on the traditional media—
were adding journalists to their tech-heavy staffs (Mitchell, 2014). Meanwhile, Moody’s
Investors Service issued a negative Sept. 22, 2014 report on the outlook of the U.S.
newspaper industry in which it predicted continued revenue losses through 2015. The
report also predicted further consolidation in the industry as a result. Noting the
industry’s feverish attempt to develop new digital products to replace dying traditional
ones, the investor service noted that, for the most part, newspapers are simply not
keeping up, and in fact, gains from online revenue are mostly short term and very small
(Moody’s, 2014).
Enormous gaps in news coverage exist already thanks to corporate media’s focus
on profits—or lack thereof—over public service. Luckily, this invites new competition
from emerging media. It is too bad Nevada policymakers appear to lack the forward
thinking needed to prepare the groundwork today for the inevitable collapse of traditional
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media tomorrow. Nevada’s shield law will certainly be near useless when that happens.
Nevada journalists, too, share some of this blame. In 1969 and 1975, efforts to first gain
and then improve the state’s shield law were led by journalists. But in 2014, journalists,
under the auspices of the state’s press association, actively thwarted efforts to revise the
law. What does that portend for the future of journalism in Nevada? As online ventures
replace traditional, will Nevada’s press association be forced to endorse changing the
shield law to be more inclusive? Or will old media fight new media to protect its turf?
Policymakers and journalists both should reflect on these questions and do what is right
for the profession and the public it serves.

Conclusion

This history of the Nevada shield law is the only one of its kind, but by no means
is it complete. For instance, a diligent search of the Reno Evening Gazette’s archives at
the University of Nevada Las Vegas, did not yield a copy of the original story that led to
Raggio threatening to put Lerude in jail if he did not give him the names “of those
felons” smoking pot on the University of Nevada campus in 1968. Many front page
stories detailed pot arrests and the scourge of drugs in Reno, but the story Lerude cites as
the spark that led to the creation of Nevada’s first shield law remains elusive. Inevitably,
lost to this history are comments from Raggio and Warren “Snowy” Monroe, key players
in this historical drama who are now deceased.
Smith (2013) noted the near total absence from the literature of state shield law
histories such as this one. Future research in this regard then could endeavor to piece
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together similar histories, perhaps providing a compendium of “on-the-ground” facts
about how states across the country managed to wrangle shield laws—weak or strong,
qualified or absolute—from their legislatures. This could prove valuable in developing a
better understanding of the ways the public and local elected officials express their
commitment to sustaining a free and independent press outside of how courts have
adjudged the matter. Indeed, if it is up to the states to decide the fate of American
journalism, then it may be critically important to the viability of this nation’s democratic
society to compile, compare and analyze this data. The media landscape has changed
dramatically from founding fathers to Internet revolution. While the information
structures in America have evolved, prospered, perished and been replaced, journalism
and the profoundly important role it plays in protecting democratic institutions has
changed little. Reporters protecting the identities of confidential sources from
government overreach, a fundamental necessity of the journalism practice, has changed
not at all. Comfort can be taken in this fact. Clearly, most Americans agree, since some
form of protection allowing journalists to keep their confidences has been legislatively or
judicially embraced by virtually every state in the nation.
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APPENDICES
The following documents are copies of originals cited throughout the preceding
thesis. These are compiled here for historical reference. They reflect the available public
records regarding Nevada’s shield law, its origins, revisions to as well as later attempts to
craft a more modern version. The information contained in these documents offers a
unique window into Nevada’s past. They also represent a unique, state-level glimpse at
how a shield statute is created.
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APPENDIX N
2014 PRIVACY SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS & MISSION

Report to the Nevada Technological Crimes Advisory Board (TCAB)
From
the Technical Privacy Subcommittee
By
Hal Berghel, Subcommittee Chair

1. Background: The Technical Privacy Subcommittee was created by TCAB on September 5, 2013, and
the members were appointed by Attorney General Cortez Masto on October 18, 2013. The mission
of  the  Subcommittee  is  “to  (1)  make  recommendations  to  the  Nevada  Attorney  General  and  
Technological Crime Advisory Board; (2) to monitor changes in international, federal, and state
policy and legislation regarding technical privacy protections; and (3) serve an advisory function to
the Nevada Attorney General and Technological Crime Advisory Board regarding the protection of
personal privacy as it relates to technology in Nevada including, but not limited to, medical data,
financial  information,  location  information,  and  communication.”   The initial Subcommittee
members were: Hal Berghel, Prof. of Computer Science, UNLV (chair); Stephen Bates, Assoc. Prof of
Journalism, UNLV; Dennis Cobb, consultant and former Deputy Chief of LVMPD; James Earl, Cyber
Counsel for the State of Nevada; James Elste, CEO Cognitive Extension, Inc.; Allen Leichtenstein,
General Counsel, ACLU of Nevada; Ira Victor, Digital Forensic Examiner, Data Clone Labs. The
assigned legal counsel is Brett Kandt, Special Deputy Attorney General and Executive Director of
TCAB.
2. The first “organizational” meeting was convened by conference call December 6, 2013. At that time
several strategic and tactical topics were brought before the Subcommittee for consideration
including:
a. The latitude of states to expand constitutional privacy protections to citizens
b. Possible legislation that might expand the news shield privilege under NRS 49.275
c. Possible legislation to expand state racketeering statutes NRS 207.360-.400] to include
(possibly amended versions of) NRS 205A.040 and/or NRS 205.473-513.
d. Possible revisions to the State of Nevada Online Privacy Policy
e. Possible legislation to expand the State encryption Policy
f. Possible legislation to prohibit Internet Service Providers from lowering the level of
security/privacy without explicit customer notification
g. Possible legislation to prohibit sale of security/privacy software that has been hobbled to
lower protections below the level advertised
h. Possible legislation to prohibit sale of software that has (a) known security limitations, or (b)
back doors without complete disclosure in the end user license agreement (EULA)
i. Possible  legislation  to  prohibit  the  operation  of  updating  services  (aka  “drizzlers)  for  any  
purpose other than those disclosed to the end user
3. The second meeting was convened in-person via telecom facilities provided by the Attorney
General’s  office on February 21, 2014.
a. Of the initial topics considered at the December 6 meeting, the Subcommittee moved on
items b. and parts of c. first.
i. Stephen Bates and Allen Leichtenstein proposed a revision of the Nevada Shield Law
that was positively received by the Subcommittee. Bates and Leichtenstein will
discuss their revision with the Nevada Press Association and report back to the
Subcommittee at the next meeting April 17, 2014.
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APPENDIX O
2014 PRIVACY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES (4/17/14)—page 1

might be the best way. All of that leads me to this conclusion, Dennis, great work, good
security practices, let’s put this on the Office of Information Security to take up as a
responsibility and try to move that forward. Then focus specifically on the sort of what
we think privacy-wise needs to be protected.
Maybe that’s what we need ultimately is the kind of Rosetta stone classification
schemes. It will translate classification schemes from one agency to the next.
Mr. Berghel:
It makes good sense to me.
12.
Discussion and possible action on proposed legislation to expand the
news shield privilege under NRS 49.275 to address gaps created by technology.
Mr. Berghel:
Next is the proposed revision of the News Shield Law that was handled by Allen and
Stephen.
Mr. Bates:
In some points, it is like the license plate reader issue in that it seems to be really timely
and maybe more than I expected in the case of this. The Media Law Resource Center
has a model shield law they had a lot of suggestions for this but have said we should
work together in the weeks to come and try to come up with something that everyone
could benefit from. I talked with Barry Smith from the Nevada Press Association. We
exchanged emails. He had some good suggestions.
Mr. Berghel:
Allen, do you have anything to add to that?
Mr. Lichtenstein:
I kind of agree. We have one of the stronger News Shield Laws of any place that I’m
aware. There is kind of “if it ain’t broke, don’t break it” feeling.
Mr. ??
I would like to add some language that speaks of through any medium now in existence
or exists in the future, to address when you have this new media that pop up so that
way it kind of covers it. The other question I have is on number 5 and I think that people
do have this question of if a subpoena is issued.
Mr. Berghel:
In the interest of time, it’s obvious we are going to carry this over. Does anyone in the
North have any input for Allen and Stephen on the Shield Law?
Mr. Elste:
I wanted to share some of the feedback Jim Earl and I got from David and the folks at
EFF this morning because we had some time on the call to have a discussion about the
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Shield Law. I found their comments rather informative. The first thing that they said
and I think you should take this to heart was that this is one of the “more rock solid” laws
that they have seen. They have been looking at news shield laws across the country so
I think that speaks very well the language that Stephen and Allen have developed.
They told us that they looked for certain things in Shield Laws and three of the things
they looked for were really protection of the journalistic sources, like the identity of
sources, the documentary information that they use to produce a journalistic output, like
notes, photos, etc., so making sure that our language is expansive enough to cover not
just the product that they produce but also all of the material that goes into producing
that product. The third thing was the eye-witness observations that they collected in the
form of developing that journalistic output.
One of probably the most important pieces of feedback and one that I think will bear
some discussion for our group is that they look at the type of information that is covered
and who does that apply to. From EFF’s perspective, it is the functional definition of
journalism that’s more important than a status definition of journalism. I believe what we
have in the current language is you have to be a certain type of journalist to be covered
as opposed to looking strictly speaking at the act of journalism, the function of creating
or otherwise producing journalistic output. We may want to consider looking at a way to
functionally define journalism as opposed to what is currently a series of labels as if you
are one of these, then you’re a journalist. Part of that is encompassing non sort of
news-related journalist and folks who are for instance, a book author who may be doing
investigative journalism of a sort to produce a book that will not be regularly published
or meet that regularity requirement. I think that one really resonated for me because an
unpublished author who is doing investigative journalism or producing a book that is
using investigative techniques may well need the same sort of protection. Those were
the primary elements of feedback received.
Mr. Earl:
Essentially, the position we took after EFF laid out its functionality preference was to
say, OK, I can kind of understand what you mean conceptually where you would like to
define the scope of application based on function rather than on definitions and this
extends to a protected class which is described this way for this list of protected things.
We went on to say that’s fine, if we understand that conceptually, can you give us some
examples of the type of functional definitions that you think we might want to consider
substituting for the ones that exist right now. My recollection is that they were going to
provide Jim Elste with some examples. As soon as that happens, my suggestion would
be Jim automatically shares with the Chair and the Chair considers disseminating it to
Committee Members.
Mr. Elste:
Happy to do so.
Barry Smith:
I am Director of the Nevada Press Association and would like it on the record that I am
here and willing to help and answer any questions and be of assistance however I can.
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Mr. Berghel:
Thank you. You are in contact with him I take it, Stephen? Do you have enough to
proceed with your next revision? I’m interested in looking at how different states
address it. We’ll carry this over for the next meeting.
13.
Discussion and possible action on proposed amendments to NRS 205.473.513, inclusive, “Unlawful Acts Regarding Computers and Information Services”.
Mr. Berghel:
We’ll carry this over for the next meeting as well.
14.
Discussion and possible action on request for Nevada Legislature to pass
joint resolution calling on Nevada congressional delegation to expand online
privacy rights under federal law.
Mr. Earl:
Nothing additional but my recollection of in terms of how a legislator would move
forward with a change to the Nevada Constitution under Item 10 is pretty much the
same way that any joint resolution would be handled. If we are moving forward drafting
one joint resolution which would have the effect putting forward an amendment to the
Constitution, we might view this other as simply yet another joint resolution to be
formulated. Is that fair?
Mr. Kandt:
I think what Jim is saying and I would agree is that with both the proposals under Item
10 and 14 – they are pretty straightforward. You’ve already taken action on Item 10. I
think you could take action on Item 14 without any specific language because that
would actually be drafted by LCB upon the legislator’s request. If you wanted to take
action on 14 today, and then those are ready to go to the Tech Crime Advisory Board
for their consideration, and then, possibly being picked up by one or more legislators.
Mr. Elste:
Should we develop a draft of what that request should look like so that it’s more
formalized in terms of what we’re asking them to produce without necessarily producing
the actual resolution that they are going to use? Is that the next logical step for us?
Mr. Kandt:
I don’t think it’s a necessary step, that’s up to you whether you want to do that or not but
just in terms of presenting it to a legislator, I don’t think you even need that much
specificity.
Mr. Elste:
I would tend to advocate for us providing some specificity so that it was clear what we’re
asking that legislator or the Tech Crime Advisory Board to agree to and take forward or
what we’re asking the legislature to do. I think if we put it out there as a request for
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Mr. Elste:
Just a comment on the list of statutes and Supreme Court decisions – the attorney general’s office in
California recently published a similar type of compendium of California statutes, decisions and made that
available publicly on their website. We may well want to consider trying to take the work that Allen has
done and see if we can assist in developing something similar because it’s great that we’ve been able to
identify certain statutes that are relevant, it would be even better to socialize those broadly to the public at
large.
Mr. Berghel:
Good point. Any other comments? Brett, I would like two action items to come out of this – one, that as
time permits, Allen will get to me the report in advance of our next meeting which I will then send to Brett for
distribution; and secondly, since Jim Elste has already seen the California document, if you could kindly
send me the URL, I will put it in my little notebook which of course, is available to all of you online.
Mr. Lichtenstein:
Just as an aside, as an attorney who also is licensed in and does practice in California, I think it’s fairly safe
to say that California has a much more detailed statutory scheme for things like this which tends to have a
much shorter list of statutes.
Mr. Berghel:
I think that would be a useful point of departure for us when we take up this topic at that next meeting that is
what the difference is between what we hear from Allen concerning the Nevada statutes and what Jim is
telling us about the California statutes. We might be able to extract from the difference some areas that
need direction for us. I’d like to see us discuss that at the next meeting.
9. Discussion and possible action on proposed legislation to expand the news shield privilege
under NRS 49.275 to address gaps created by technology.
Mr. Berghel:
As per the request of our guest, we will take Item 9 next. Discussion and possible action on the proposed
legislation to expand the Nevada Shield Law. It’s my understanding that you have taken the lead on this
Stephen, so please do so.
Mr. Bates:
As mentioned at the last meeting we are recommending a functional approach so that we talk about a
person that does journalism rather than an employment-based approach. I have some statutes and I would
think the strongest argument for a penalty is the third party provision. If a subpoena is issued to you, you
file a motion to quash that’s the end but you find a subpoena is issued for your telephone records, as a
reporter, and they didn’t give you the requisite notice and the chance to object, then I wonder if should be
penalty of some sort.
Mr. Lichtenstein:
I’m trying to get a vision of how that would work in a practical sense. I just can’t sit here and issue a
subpoena, there needs to be a party and I guess you would talk about a third party subpoena; it would be
up to the court to provide that notice. Certainly, we are going to run into a particular problem in terms of any
penalty is that there is a court involved. You don’t get to penalize the court. This is something that we were
talking about before we came in. That doesn’t prevent filing anti-SLAPP suit in terms of abuse of process
and the like.
Mr. Berghel:
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Stephen is referring to the conversation I had with him and then later with Allen about my digital security
patent that I am putting on now. I wouldn’t make a distinction between de facto and de jure penalties. The
de jure penalties are the ones that our lawyer colleagues are familiar with. The de facto penalties are the
ones that accrue by what Allen refers to as nuisance actions on the part of attorneys that have the effect, in
the case of journalists, primarily, potentially forcing them into bankruptcy trying to defend themselves. I had
an example in mind, the journalist that this happened to but I can’t think of the name right now, however, I
can come up with the name and that is the prosecution of Drake who was accused of leaking classified
information to a newspaper and that prosecution went on for 6 years and bankrupted Drake. At the end of 6
years, the judge said I don’t understand why we are dealing with this. There’s no substance here,
dismissed. From the government’s point of view, according to Drake, there’s some argument for that. The
government got what they wanted. He’s in terrible financial shape and anybody that saw that case is well
aware of the fact that they don’t need to find you guilty in a court of law to silence you. They can simply ruin
you. Now, the thing is which was where I was headed with this, Drake, as I understand, has no recourse.
Mr. Lichtenstein:
I’m not familiar with the case. Is this a criminal prosecution?
Mr. Berghel:
Under the 1917 Espionage Act.
Mr. Lichtenstein:
Unfortunately, criminal prosecutions from places like the NSA are very hard to fight. NSA, itself, if very hard
to fight because they don’t want to disclose much of anything
In a civil matter, however, one might say if a defendant can always pursue under a civil rights violation
where you can get attorneys’ fees.
Mr. Berghel:
We’ve got a few attorneys on our committee. Are we trying to take an action on this, Brett, so we can give
this to the Attorney General as a recommendation?
Mr. Kandt:
Timing is somewhat key here. You’ve got a number of items listed as action items. I have actually listed all
of these as potential action items on the agenda for the Tech Crime Advisory Board when it meets next
Thursday and that is I realize you may not take action on all of these items but to the extent you did, I
wanted the Tech Crime Advisory Board to be able to consider them next week because time is of the
essence in terms of any proposal for legislation is going to have to find a sponsor. That process is already
taking place right now and is already in full swing. For legislators, they have to submit their bill draft
requests, they start in August, they have a timeframe between August and December 10th, I think. The
Attorney General’s bill draft package has to be submitted by September 2nd. Executive Branch state
agencies are already submitting their requests to the governor’s office because they have to have theirs
submitted by August 1st so that process is already in full swing so to the extent you wanted to get anything
before the Tech Crime Advisory Board, I put it all here and put it all on their agenda so that could take
place.
Mr. Berghel:
We are all thinking about whether this shield law is potentially ready for prime time. Could we ask our guest
to identify himself and chime in with whatever comment he might care to make.
Mr. Smith:
I’m Director of the Nevada Press Association. I think I didn’t really have a lot to comment on because I do
think this is a good approach. This is the right approach, the way this ought to be addressed. I would just
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reiterate that I expect that it still will make members of my association and others nervous to be touching
the Shield Law at all. I’m contradicting myself and I would advise them that this is way we ought to be going
but I’m just telling you that that I won’t have a unanimous response to that.
Mr. Berghel:
Barry, what might this committee do to assuage their fears?
journalists in the state.

We are, after all, trying to do this for the

Mr. Smith:
Exactly, I think it’s a good policy discussion that ought to be taking place in front of the legislature so I would
discourage you from presenting this or similar language to try to this approach and have that discussion. I
just would say that I can envision not only members of my association but others not being in unanimous
support of it and being nervous about opening that up at all. I would discourage you from preparing what
you think is the best approach because I do think it is beneficial in the long run.
Mr. Bates:
I wonder if members of your association might be not as keenly interested in the definition
Mr. Smith:
I think that’s beneficial, yes. And, again, I don’t have, as you say, for the most part, my members are
protected because they are defined under the law. They work for an organization where this is headed is
this definition of the practice instead of the job. I don’t have a few of my member who aren’t covered by the
current shield law. That’s why I say, it’s the right approach, in my opinion, and that it’s a good policy
discussion to place before the legislature.
Mr. Berghel:
Barry, are you more nervous about touching the statute than you are about the substance of the draft.
Mr. Smith:
Yes, definitely.
Mr. Berghel:
OK, that’s an important consideration because once the legislature decides to deal with something, they
can decide that don’t believe in shield laws and just revoke the whole thing. Certainly, it’s a legitimate point.
Brett, Jim Earl, you know about how the legislative process works. Is the way to deal with this to try to
enfranchise some senators and assembly persons to prepare them to support this, is that the way this is
done?
Mr. Kandt:
In terms of my approach to a bill, building consensus but then you stakeholders beforehand, there’s a
process whereby the bill gets assigned to a committee and then reaching out to the committee chair and
those members to explain the purpose of the bill and answer any questions even before it gets heard in a
committee, is an important step. Reaching out to leadership so the speaker, the majority leader, and even
the leadership in the minority parties would also be a part of the process as well. It differs depending upon
whether it’s a bill that’s being carried by a legislator versus a bill that’s coming out of the executive branch
but that’s generally the approach I take.
Mr. Earl:
Let me add to that in terms of trying to address some of the practicalities that face us as a subcommittee.
The way which this might work is the following, or at least the way I would envision it:
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If we were to recommend this for consideration by the Tech Crime Advisory Board, assuming that there is
complete board membership at that next meeting next week, then you would have the following potential
sponsors exposed to the text. You would have the Attorney General, and you would have the senator and
assemblyperson who are members of the Tech Crime Advisory Board exposed to the text. The way which I
would approach this, given the discussion that has taken place so far, and I can certainly understand the
reason why any constituent who or any constituency that feels it has been favored in some way by existing
legislation, is very reluctant to that legislation opened for what might be to them, a marginal benefit given
that the risks of some type of renegade legislative response. I think that there is a different way to cast this
in terms of economic development and that is there’s a growing blogging community if you are a successful
blogger, you don’t have to be located in New York of San Francisco or Los Angeles, you might as well be
located in Las Vegas or Douglas County or Incline Village. If you somewhat attracted to any of those areas
anywhere, the existence of a shield law that would cover you might, in fact, be sufficient to get you to come
to Nevada and write from here. In addition to those legislators who we would normally think of having some
type of interest and membership of the Tech Crime Advisory Board, there may be others that other
members of this particular body may know who would see this from an economic development perspective.
I’d just as soon have as many smart writers in the state as we can possibly get, frankly.
Mr. Victor:
I think that’s an outstanding idea by Mr. Earl. Now, full disclosure, I am somewhat involved in blogs and
podcasts so I am biased but those biases acknowledged, I think it’s a great idea and to that end, the
comments that you made, Mr. Chairman, about requiring payments of attorney fees for harassing
subpoenas and also penalty for anyone who issues a third party subpoena without the requisite five days, I
think some language that helps shield independent bloggers and podcasters and such from that sort of
litigation would also encourage them to come here. I’m thinking about subpoenas that require voluminous
electronic information can be a burden to an independent writer who may have data on cloud systems, on
servers in an office, may have data backup or located in other places and backup tapes and subpoenas that
require that are often written to say ALL information are a huge burden to third parties that receive those
subpoenas. By carving out some safe harbor and some provisions to protect bloggers and independent
journalists would again go to Mr. Earl’s point that this becomes a great place to be a writer entrepreneur
and build it up. And, I would remind for the record, some very successful what are considered now as
establishment news sites were started as blogs, Tech Crunch, for example, Huffington Post, these were
independent bloggers basically that then became so popular that we now consider them the media but they
really were the seedlings, they were bloggers. This is a significant area of public good because it
disseminates more and more information and a source of economic growth to those communities where
these once bloggers but now real legitimate larger businesses locate.
Mr. Elste:
Two thoughts: one just to build on this question of protecting against legal costs – I would advocate against
putting that into the shield law. This is a law that is directed at fundamentally First Amendment privileges.
Let’s not muddy the waters by trying to solve the problem of the cost of litigation. That is a completely
separate issue that is something that should probably be handled as a separate piece of statutory
language and keep the focus of the shield law on what we define as journalism; what sort of protections
we’re going to afford those people that are journalists or by practicing journalism. We need to try to keep
this as focused as possible on the act of providing that shield.
The second observation I had was for Barry which is I can certainly understand the concerns of even
touching the existing language; however, would it be helpful if the members of your organization have the
opportunity to have discussions with folks on our committee or otherwise have some dialogue around this to
see both the rationale behind the language that’s been put together and some of the genesis of that in
terms of conversations with EFF and try to conquer their support. I think this is a piece of potential
legislation that really does advance the cause for protecting journalists and journalism in affording those
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First Amendment Rights. It would be a shame not to have the press association shoulder to shoulder with
us at the table.
Mr. Smith:
I absolutely agree that the dilemma I’m in is very well summarized. My constituency is 90% protected by
the existing but my future constituency is not so that’s what I am trying to balance myself and that’s why I
say, it’s the right approach, it’s the right thing to do and I absolutely agree. I think intellectually, they would
agree with me that this would be groundbreaking in some respects. It’s absolute, again, that it is the correct
approach and the right way to do things; it doesn’t mean they wouldn’t be nervous about it.
Mr. Elste:
One other thought, a lot of the sources of information for your 90% that are covered as professional
journalists are the bloggers, are the people that are out there gathering this information, . There’s an
economic incentive for your protected members or professional journalist members.
Mr. Smith:
If I might, when you talk about legislation and you talk about how its approach to be brought into the
legislature and you start talking about anything that kind of expands the scope, you start to bring in other
potential parties that have an interest in it, stakeholders, that will for one reason or another, object to
anything else you put in there. Just to bring that up from my experience and pretty obvious but I thought I’d
throw that out. Thank you.
Mr. Berghel:
Do I sense that we are in agreement that we’ll go with what we have, we’re not going to try to embellish it?
It’s my sense of the discussion that this is a winning proposition for the journalists if legislators see this as
an opportunity to strengthen our already strong shield law. I think we should assume that the legislators will
see the benefit, think of the big picture and be inclined to support it. We should proceed on that basis.
As a practical consideration, this subcommittee is going to have to decide whether to recommend it to the
TCAB and secondly, we should know from Barry what we can do to help his constituency recognize the
value of enlarging the statute.
Let’s take the latter first: Barry, what can we do to help get the word out with your constituency?
Mr. Smith:
It’s kind of up to me to get it out to them but to certainly be open to the questions and provide the
information and I think if they had been at this meeting today and heard what was said in the discussion that
would be far more comfortable if this same discussion was what happened before a legislative committee,
I’d have no problem but again, you never know what’s going to happen so It will be up to me to explain to
them and any help I can get as far as to what the language is from Stephen he certainly has lots of contacts
in the south. We have some time to make to make them comfortable. I appreciate any help we can get.
Mr. Earl:
At an appropriate time, I’m prepared to move that we recommend the current text to the Tech Crime
Advisory Board for consideration and possible adoption by either the Attorney General or one of the
participating legislators into a BDR. Part of the reason that I say that in addition to what you’ve already
heard me say is that I think that there needs to be something around which to distill and discuss, and I don’t
want to speak for Barry, but if I were in his position, it would be easier for me to gather my constituents and
say, look, there’s something you really need to pay attention to because this potential piece of legislation
took a baby step on the last day of May when the subcommittee of the Tech Crime Advisory Board voted to
recommend it. I don’t know who that could be, to put before the EFF or for the blogger communities in
addition to what the various positions are. At the appropriate time, I’d be willing to make that motion.
Mr. Berghel:
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I think that it’s quite the appropriate time. Do I hear a second?
Mr. Bates:
Second.
Mr. Berghel:
All in favor, say Aye. Opposed? Failing to hear any opposition, we will report that the unanimous
recommendation of the quorum to recommend this to the TCAB.
Mr. Kandt:
Just for clarification, since there are the current, we’ve got a couple of different drafts, and some discussion
at the bottom about some definitions under the functional approach, could I ask Mr. Bates just to maybe
over the weekend, could you clean it up into the final and email it to me and I will make sure that is what the
board has so they don’t get confused as to what you recommended and what they are looking at. Thank
you.
Mr. Bates:
I will assume we are talking about the May 2014 draft and not the April or any other functional approach
definitions, correct?
Mr. Kandt:
I don’t want to give them this. I don’t want to give them these two pages because it won’t be clear to them
and I don’t feel it’s my place to cut and paste them. I think it’s appropriate for you, if you just send me what
you want presented to the board, I’ll make sure it gets to them.
Mr. Berghel:
Barry, thank you for participating and would it be possible for you and select members of your organization
to come to the next TCAB meeting?
Mr. Smith:
I plan to be there. I’ll probably get the word out tomorrow morning that this is some recommended
language and we’ll see what kind of reaction I get. I will let them know that meeting is going to happen and
they won’t have any excuse for not paying attention. Thank you, again, for letting me interrupt your agenda.
6. Report from James Elste on request for assistance from Electronic Frontier Foundation to develop
legislation to expand online privacy rights. (Discussion Only) Action may not be taken on any matter
brought up under this agenda item until scheduled on an agenda for action at a later meeting.
Mr. Elste:
I don’t have very much to report other than after our last meeting’s discussion on the engagement of the
EFF, I did pass along both Allen and Stephen’s contact information and, if I’m judging correctly, you,
gentleman, has a subsequent conversation with EFF and it was fruitful and helped influence the language in
the Shield Law. I would say, in many respects, we’ve opened up the dialogue with EFF and they are strong
supporters of work we are doing here. I hope we will continue to move forward on that.
Mr. Berghel:
Thank you. Any discussion on Item 6? Brett, I think we can take that off the next agenda.
7. Discussion and possible action on proposed amendment to the Nevada Constitution establishing a
right to privacy.
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Nevada Shield Law—Revised
Stephen Bates and Allen Lichtenstein 4/14/14

current:
NRS 49.275 News media. No reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or television station may be
required to disclose any published or unpublished information obtained or prepared by such
person in such person’s professional capacity in gathering, receiving or processing information
for communication to the public, or the source of any information procured or obtained by such
person, in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation:
1. Before any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury or any officer thereof.
2. Before the Legislature or any committee thereof.
3. Before any department, agency or commission of the State.
4. Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local
government.

proposed:
1. “News organization” means a newspaper, periodical, press association, radio station,
television station, online source of information about current events, or book publisher.
2. “Journalist” means a reporter, editor, writer, researcher, photographer, videographer, or
editorial worker, currently or formerly employed by or under contract to a news organization, or
whose work appears in one or more news organizations.
3. “Legal proceeding” means any hearing, trial, or investigation:
(a) Before any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury, or any officer thereof.
(b) Before the Legislature or any committee thereof.
(c) Before any department, agency, or commission of the State.
(d) Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local
government.
4. No journalist may be required to disclose any published or unpublished information
obtained, related to, or prepared by such person in such person’s professional capacity in
gathering, receiving, or processing information for communication to the public, or the source of
any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding.
5. A party issuing a subpoena in any legal proceeding to a third party that seeks the
records of a journalist or a news organization shall provide notice of the subpoena to both the
journalist and the news organization at least five days before issuing the subpoena. The notice
shall include, at a minimum, an explanation of why the requested records will be of material
assistance to the party seeking them and why alternate sources of information are not sufficient
to avoid the need for the subpoena.
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Nevada Shield Law—Revised
Stephen Bates and Allen Lichtenstein 5/28/14

current:
NRS 49.275 News media. No reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or television station may be
required to disclose any published or unpublished information obtained or prepared by such
person  in  such  person’s  professional  capacity  in   gathering,  receiving  or  processing  information  
for communication to the public, or the source of any information procured or obtained by such
person, in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation:
1. Before  any  court,  grand  jury,  coroner’s  inquest,  jury  or  any  officer  thereof.
2. Before the Legislature or any committee thereof.
3. Before any department, agency or commission of the State.
4. Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local
government.
May 2014 draft:
1.  “Journalism”  means  gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, filming,
recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing information concerning matters of potential
interest for dissemination to a segment of the public, in any medium of expression that currently
exists or shall exist in the future.
2.  “Legal  proceeding”  means  any  hearing,  trial,  or  investigation:
(a) before  any  court,  grand  jury,  coroner’s  inquest,  jury,  or  any  officer  thereof;
(b) before the Legislature or any committee thereof;
(c) before any department, agency, or commission of the State; or
(d) before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local
government.
3. In any legal proceeding, no person or entity engaged in activities of journalism may be
required to disclose any published or unpublished information related in any way to activities of
journalism engaged in by any person or entity.
4. A party issuing a subpoena in any legal proceeding to a third party that seeks the
records of a person or entity engaged in activities of journalism shall provide notice of the
subpoena to the person or entity at least five days before issuing the subpoena. The notice shall
include, at a minimum, an explanation of why the requested records will be of material
assistance to the party seeking them and why alternate sources of information are not sufficient
to avoid the need for the subpoena.
5. In the case of a person or entity whose activities do not fall within the definition of
“journalism”  set  forth  in  subsection  (1),  a  judge  may exercise discretion to apply the provisions
of subsections (3) and (4) if the judge determines that doing so would serve the interest of justice
by aiding or protecting activities related in any way to the dissemination of information.
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April 2014 draft:
1.  “News  organization”  means  a  newspaper,  periodical,  press  association,  radio  station,  
television station, online source of information about current events, or book publisher.
2.  “Journalist”  means  a  reporter,  editor,  writer,  researcher,  photographer,  videographer,  or  
editorial worker, currently or formerly employed by or under contract to a news organization, or
whose work appears in one or more news organizations.
3.  “Legal  proceeding”  means  any  hearing,  trial,  or  investigation:
(a) Before  any  court,  grand  jury,  coroner’s  inquest,  jury,  or  any  officer  thereof.
(b) Before the Legislature or any committee thereof.
(c) Before any department, agency, or commission of the State.
(d) Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local
government.
4. No journalist may be required to disclose any published or unpublished information
obtained,  related  to,  or  prepared  by  such  person  in  such  person’s  professional  capacity  in  
gathering, receiving, or processing information for communication to the public, or the source of
any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding.
5. A party issuing a subpoena in any legal proceeding to a third party that seeks the
records of a journalist or a news organization shall provide notice of the subpoena to both the
journalist and the news organization at least five days before issuing the subpoena. The notice
shall include, at a minimum, an explanation of why the requested records will be of material
assistance to the party seeking them and why alternate sources of information are not sufficient
to avoid the need for the subpoena.
EFF recommends the functional definition in (1) and the safety net in (5), though the
language may need tweaking.
I  assume  that  we  needn’t  define  “public,”  i.e.,  audience.
Hal  wonders  if  there’s  a  way  to  require  payment  of  attorney’s  fees  or  some  such  for  
harassing subpoenas. Helpful?
Is it feasible and worthwhile to include some sort of penalty for anyone who issues a
third-party  subpoena  without  the  requisite  five  days’  notice?
I guess that might be possible for the third-party subpoenas
functional approach
1. The  term  ‘journalism’  means  the  gathering,  preparing,  collecting,  photographing,  recording,  

writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information that concerns local, national, or
international events or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the public.
(House shield law bill)
the  term  “a  representative  of  the  news  media”  means  any  person  or  entity  that  gathers  
information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw
materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience.
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D. Legislation to expand the news shield privilege under NRS 49.275 to address gaps
created by technology
The Shield Law is in your back up. A lot of these have back up items but they’re not fully
gestated at this point. The point of the Shield Law modification revision was this: Modern
journalism is no longer restricted to the traditional journalistic employers, by that I mean,
publishers, newspapers, electronic media outlets like television news rooms and the like.
Now, we are seeing blogospheres delivering fairly high quality and in some cases, accurate
reporting and the Subcommittee would like to remind the Board that many of the accepted
online venues for news coverage, such as the Huffington Post and the blogospheres such
as that are considered to be fairly reliable and useful. But they are not protected under the
Nevada Statute as it now stands so we’ve proposed a revision to that statute that seeks to
incorporate coverage to those who act as journalists not based on the nature of the
employment relationship. I’m not a lawyer so I’m going to have to leave it to Madame
Chair’s discretion whether this is something that she would feel comfortable in supporting.
It is our feeling that is, the Privacy Subcommittee’s feeling, that in the absence of a federal
Shield Law, we are still, I would remind all of us that are non-lawyers, we are still operating
under Brandsburg which means there is no federal protection at all. It’s left to the states to
protect journalism. We see cases all of the time these days where the federal government
has decided to suppress a journalist for covering some piece of newsworthy information or
other. To the extent that it is possible to protect the journalists, it has to be done at the
state level. We propose that the already excellent Nevada statute be further enhanced.
Since that is a recommendation to the Board, I’ll pause here if any of you have questions or
comments.
General Masto:
So, the way I am looking at Agenda Item Number D in the actual proposal is the law
already exists and the enhancement is to include or broaden it to include technology and
the journalism that occurs through blogging in the new technology and the new medium, is
that correct?
Mr. Berghel:
Yes, it’s worded in such a way that we don’t have to be technology focused because by the
time we get the new statute passed, the technology will have changed again. We’ve
endeavored in this proposed statute revision to expand the coverage on the basis of the
function of the journalist not the particular manner or means by which they apply their
journalistic skills.
Mr. Owens:
I have on question. I am certainly not an attorney but as a law enforcement representative,
I would just have a concern – would this then give any blogger the right to be shielded
pretty much anybody that posts anything for others to see that we would not be able to
require them to give up sources or specific information.
Mr. Berghel:
Yes, the intent is that if a person is engaged in journalism and the definition here is
provided in that first paragraph, so to the extent that a person is doing that, yes, they would
be covered. Whether the activity is represented by some kind of newsprint or an online
source.
Draft Minutes
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Mr. Owens:
At face value, that isn’t something that I’d be wanting to support from the law enforcement
aspect of it.
General Masto:
I have a follow-up – did you reach out or talk with the press association regarding this.
Mr. Berghel:
Yes, Madame Chair, we did engage them. Brett, what was Brian’s last name?
Mr. Kandt:
Barry Smith with the Nevada Press Association.
Mr. Berghel:
Please let Barry address the question that was just raised.
Mr. Smith:
I am Barry Smith, Director of the Nevada Press Association. I was fortunate enough and
appreciate the Privacy Subcommittee letting me talk to them a couple of times. This is an
issue very near and dear to the Press Association where this came from originally. We do
have, in Nevada, one of the best Shield Laws in the nation. It does, as I told them, for 90
percent of my members, we’re covered and we’re covered very well so our point of view is
that we are kind of hesitant to touch it.
On the other hand, I did express to the Subcommittee that this is a good way to go about
looking at this issue. Not so much who is covered but what their intent is, what activity that
they are actually doing. As you see in the language, it really changes it from covering a
journalist to covering acts of journalism. I think it’s a good approach from the Press
Association’s point of view, for the most part, as I say, most of our members are
newspapers covered explicitly by the statute. I do have members though and I expect I will
more members in the future who are not specifically defined in that statute as being
covered by the Shield Law. So far, there have been a couple of instances in the state and
district court level where the issue has come up and the judges have pretty liberally
construed that if it looks like a newspaper, the quote I used is just because you are reading
a book on a Kindle doesn’t mean it’s not a book. So just because you are reading a
newspaper online, doesn’t mean it’s not a newspaper. But, that’s not the way the statute
reads. That’s my point of view on it and I’ll be glad to answer any questions you have
about it.
General Masto:
Thank you. I guess let me ask you a question that relates to what Jim Owens just brought
up. I guess the question I would have for the press association is do you see a distinction
when we define journalism between your membership and maybe, somebody who is
blogging online their journal or topical information but they are not related to per say a news
organization. Is there a distinction in your mind or with respect to your association?
Draft Minutes
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Mr. Smith:
Yes, I do think there is a distinction. It’s becoming more blurred all the time and this was
pointed out some of the most popular, best read, news sources in the country. It would not
qualify as a newspaper or TV or broadcast, radio broadcast organization. So, it does get
into a very tricky question of defining what is journalism and that’s why, on the federal level,
so far, and there have been several attempts, it has not been defined, it is difficult to say
what a person is doing. Once you get into when you are hired, there is a presumption of
some level of education, training, skill, responsibility, those kinds of things. That’s why the
shorthand has generally been you work for a media organization. Is that helpful at all?
General Masto:
Yes, thank you. Any further comments or questions?
Mr. Owens:
Just for some clarification for me so according to this, if a blogger or a person who posts on
their Facebook to his fellow criminal his particular gang, these are the crimes, they take
pictures of some of the things they’ve done because it has interest to a particular segment
of the public, his fellow gang members, so that’s now protected and we can’t bring him or
require him to provide any additional information other than what he has posted?
Mr. Berghel:
Jim, I’m not an attorney. My guess is that that is the kind of thing that would be resolved by
a court. That’s part of the process. The intent here, I think, is, as Barry has pointed out, is
pretty clear. The future of journalism for especially the younger set does not involve
traditional means. That is many of us no longer subscribe to a newspapers or magazines
for that matter but we are vociferous consumers of online content and if for no other reason
than economic incentives, the spoils will go to the aggressive in attracting businesses to the
states that provide these kinds of Shield Laws. That is, if you want a Huffington Post to
start up in your midst, this kind of Shield Law that we proposed would be an incentive over
a state that doesn’t have this secure Shield Law. Now, when it comes to the details of how
the laws are sorted out and how the prosecutors handle it, that’s something, an issue that
really should be left to an attorney. I’m not one.
General Masto:
Any other comments?
E. Legislation to amend NRS 205.473-.513, inclusive, “Unlawful Acts Regarding
Computers and Information Service”.
Mr. Berghel:
Legislation to amend the statute on computer abuse. I am actually drafting that. I’ll give
you a little background because I have nothing to propose at this time. The law itself was
well intentioned but I presume written a very long time ago. The language is dated and I
think it has serious issues. From a prosecutorial point of view, I would imagine it would be
very difficult to enforce this law. I’ve taken the initiative to re-write it and it’s probably, Brett,
did you include a draft of my notes?
Mr. Kandt:
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TECHNOLOGICAL CRIME ADVISORY BOARD
Technical Privacy Subcommittee
MINUTES OF THE MEETING
August 29, 2014 at 1:30 PM
The meeting took place at the following locations:
Office of the Attorney General, Mock Courtroom
100 N. Carson Street, Carson City, NV 89701-4717
and
Office of the Attorney General, Grant Sawyer Building
555 East Washington Avenue, Suite 3315, Las Vegas, NV 89101
1.

Call to Order and Roll Call.
Hal Berghel, Chair; James Elste; Ira Victor; Stephen Bates Dennis Cobb.
Not Present: James Earl; Allen Lichtenstein. A quorum was established.

2.

Public Comment. (Discussion Only) Action may not be taken on any matter
brought up under this agenda item until scheduled on an agenda for action at a
later meeting.
There was no public comment.

3.

Chair’s Welcome. (Chair)
Mr. Berghel welcomed the members to the fifth meeting of the Subcommittee.

4.

Report on Technological Crime Advisory Board meeting of June 5, 2014, and
status of approved resolutions for Technical Privacy Subcommittee.
Mr. Berghel stated that the Subcommittee’s resolutions were discussed at the Board
meeting. There was some opposition to the proposals from the representative for the
Clark County Sheriff and from Senator Ford. The Sheriff’s representative was uneasy
with any proposal increasing the protection of privacy without studying the full
ramifications in regards to police investigations. Mr. Berghel asked for Mr. Kandt’s
assessment.
Mr. Kandt reviewed the four proposals made by the Committee:
1)
To amend the news shield law.
2)
To add the word “privacy” to the Nevada Constitution.
3)
To seek a joint resolution from the Nevada Legislature to call upon the
federal congressional delegation to look at expanding privacy protections
at the Federal level.
4)
The proposal to amend NRS 179.045 to permit the application for and
issuance of search warrants by electronic transmission.
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He reported that the Board did not endorse the first three proposals. With regards to the news
shield privilege, the representative from the Nevada Press Association was there and
indicated that 90% of his people are already covered and he was reticent to opening up the
statute to try to cover the other 10%.
With regard to all three of the proposals not endorsed by the Board, the biggest concern was
whether these proposals were outside the Board’s statutory scope. The fourth item, they
believed, did fall within their scope and they did endorse it. They will support amending the
search warrant statute provided there are appropriate protections and precautions. The
proposal has been included in a bill draft request in the Attorney General’s legislative package
that was submitted to the legislature.
Given the concerns that the other proposals were outside the statutory authority of the Board,
Mr. Kandt suggested that, because the work of this Subcommittee is so important, perhaps it
should be created as a stand-alone advisory board to look at all issues regarding digital and
technological privacy. Mr. Kandt stated he had spoken to Assemblyman David Bobzien, and
they had discussed the idea of having the legislature create a separate advisory board to look
at technological and digital privacy. Assemblyman Bobzien was very receptive to the idea and
said he would be willing to put in a bill draft request to create an advisory board. Mr. Kandt
stated that digital privacy is the major civil rights issue moving forward and it would be
appropriate to have an advisory commission to study issues and make recommendations to
the legislature.
Mr. Berghel stated that the original proposal he had made to the Attorney General two years
ago was for a board to make recommendations to the Attorney General and somehow it got
changed so that the Subcommittee reported to the Board.
In regards to the first three proposals, Mr. Berghel stated that the Board never took action on
them; rather\\, the Attorney General as chair tabled them. He clarified that it was Senator
Ford—not the entire Board—who stated his concern that the privacy resolutions fell outside
the Board’s statutory authority. Otherwise he agreed with Mr. Kandt’s assessment.
Mr. Elste thought the results of the Board meeting were disappointing. He was concerned that
the Subcommittee has spent the better part of a year on the proposals and had pulled together
a group with expertise in the field who are able to give good counsel. With three of the
proposals tabled, it concerns him that the group may feel that their efforts are not appreciated
and that their time is better spent elsewhere. It is important for Nevada to have a body whose
responsibility is to look at privacy issues. He agrees that this is the civil rights issue of our age.
The issues are complicated and it takes people who are focused on privacy issues in the
digital age to unravel them. He stated that perhaps the question is about the future of the
group and expressed hope that it can find a better structure or attachment point so it can
advance its agenda and continue with its mandate to examine privacy issues.
Mr. Victor agreed that this Board needs to exist separately, and that the issue is an important.
Nevada needs to be on the cutting edge for the sake of the public, businesses and technology
in Nevada.
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Mr. Kandt added that Mr. Berghel is correct in his clarification of Mr. Kandt’s summary of the
meeting. It’s not that the entire Board was reticent to take action, but Senator Ford expressed
the greatest concern about the Board acting outside its statutory authority. The Board was
created in 1999 and the current implications of digital privacy and developments in technology
were not yet envisioned.
Mr. Elste observed that under NRS Chapter 205A setting forth the Board’s duties, duty #5 is to
“Evaluate and recommend changes to existing civil and criminal laws relating to technological
crimes in response to current and projected changes in technology and law enforcement
techniques.” He argued that under that part of the statute, the Board is not acting outside of
the bounds of its statutory authority.
Mr. Kandt stated that as the Board’s Executive Director/General Counsel and by extension,
the Subcommittee’s General Counsel, he had never voiced any concern regarding the topics
the Subcommittee considered and the recommendations they made because he also
interpreted the statutory scope in the broadest way possible. But there were Board members
with that concern and that is why he wanted to look at creating a separate advisory board
dedicated just to the issue of technological and digital privacy. He suspected that there will be
many legislators in addition to Assemblyman Bobzien who will be interested in it.
Mr. Victor added that in the last few months the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted new
rules of civil procedure related to electronic information. They are using standards from the
Sedona Conference which is a standards body that has created specific guidelines regarding
information governance and privacy. He noted that this Subcommittee is not swimming up
against the stream. It is the direction things are going and the Nevada Supreme Court’s action
has acknowledged that.
Mr. Bates stated that things are moving fast, technology outpaces the law. There is an
advantage to having people at this stage anticipate tech privacy issues and advise others.
Mr. Berghel asked Mr. Kandt about the mechanics of how to formalize the BDR process to
create the Technical Privacy Subcommittee into a statutorily defined advisory board.
Mr. Kandt stated that he thought there were three things that would have to be flushed out in a
bill:
1) Who sits on the advisory board;
2) How to define the scope of what the advisory board can study and make
recommendations on; and
3) How to pay for the advisory board.
He advised the Subcommittee to send him any thoughts on the first two parts and he would
share them with Assemblyman Bobzien. He has already given Mr. Bobzien a broad outline but
did not address advisory board membership. Legislative attorneys will actually draft the bill.
The Subcommittee discussed alternative avenues for creating a stand-alone advisory board
such as finding an existing public body more properly aligned with the work of the
Subcommittee or creation of a new advisory board by executive order of the Governor. Mr.
Kandt stated that there is no prohibition on the Subcommittee members for exploring other
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options, but to please let him know if anyone talked to a legislator other than Mr. Bobzien
about it since Mr. Bobzien was already working on a BDR. It was noted that Mr. Bobzien’s bill
may be the best option since statutorily defined boards are more difficult to get rid of. Mr.
Berghel stated that there are other legislators who are aware of, and supportive of, the work of
the Subcommittee. It was suggested that the Subcommittee compile a list of interested
legislators and share it with Assemblyman Bobzien so that he can rally support around it.
Mr. Kandt stated he was also monitoring BDRs to identify any potential bill that may be of
interest to the Board or this Subcommittee.
Mr. Cobb asked if the recommendations of the Subcommittee were public information. Since
both the Board and the Subcommittee are open meetings, any information presented is public.
5.

Discussion and possible action on approval of May 30, 2014, meeting minutes.

Mr. Bates stated that he had sent Mr. Kandt some revisions to his remarks. Mr. Cobb made a
motion to approve the minutes with his corrections. Mr. Bates seconded the motion. The
minutes were unanimously approved.
6.

Discussion with representatives of Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Program Management Office regarding
Nevada UAS Test Site Privacy Policy (available at http://www.niasuas.com/content/nevada-uas-test-site-privacy-policy).

Don Cunningham, the Business Operations Manager for Nevada Institute for Autonomous
Systems Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Program Management Office, was in attendance.
Mr. Cunningham was one of the original proponents for a UAS test site and was part of the
team who wrote the response to the FAA’s request for comment in the competition for Nevada
to be designated as a test site. Upon designation, Mr. Cunningham went to work as the
Business Operations Manager. He is also a test coordinator and speaks on behalf of the
program to various interested parties.
Mr. Berghel stated that he had attended the first few UAS committee meetings when Ms.
Laxalt chaired the committee. He faced resistance when he suggested that they take the time
to develop a privacy policy so that they could direct the development if it were funded. Since
he had never seen a clearly articulated privacy policy, he asked Mr. Kandt to arrange for Mr.
Cunningham’s appearance to talk about it.
Mr. Cunningham explained that he wrote the privacy policy and that there are several people
in his office that handle interface with the privacy issue, but his office does not have a Chief
Privacy Officer. He directed committee members to the website where the public can view the
privacy policy (http://www.nias-uas.com/content/nevada-uas-test-site-privacy-policy). Copies
were provided for the Subcommittee members.
Mr. Cunningham stated that the Test Site wants to get out in front, and try to solve some of the
issues with privacy. He went over the highlights of the privacy policy. He said that 90% of the
UAS missions will have no issues with privacy since they will be for research and development
purposes carried out in areas with very little population. Currently, there are no projects
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